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 Semiosis and the Crisis of Meaning addresses the difference between continuity and play 
in Charles Peirce’s and Jacques Derrida’s theory of signs. The main aim is to offer a reply to 
Derrida’s reading of Peirce in Of Grammatology—a reading which results in a crisis of meaning 
by redefining the process of semiosis as a limitlessness of play. To furnish a Peircean reply, I 
draw connections between Peirce’s semiotic and both his categories of being and method of 
scientific investigation. In doing so, I attempt to circumscribe Derrida’s play by restoring a 
direction to the movement from sign to sign. In the first chapter, I give an account of Peirce’s 
early theory of signs in order to set the stage for Derrida’s reading of Peirce. In the second 
chapter, I turn to Derrida’s work, give a general outline of his project in Of Grammatology, and 
provide a close reading of his brief encounter with Peirce. In the final chapter, I return to Peirce 
to show how there is a continuity to the process of semiosis that is missing in Derrida’s reading. 
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Turning and turning in the widening gyre; 
The falcon cannot hear the falconer; 
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, 
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere    
The ceremony of innocence is drowned… 
 
…somewhere in sands of the desert    
A shape with lion body and the head of a man,    
A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun,    
Is moving its slow thighs, while all about it    
Reel shadows of the indignant desert birds.    
The darkness drops again; but now I know    
That twenty centuries of stony sleep 
Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle,    
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,    
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born? 
 
—The Second Coming, William Butler Yeats, The Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats (1989). 





In Of Grammatology, Jacques Derrida refers to Charles Peirce’s theory of signs in an 
integral move toward his “de-construction of the transcendental signified”—which shows, 
roughly, that there is no way to get outside of the network of signs to perceive the thing-in-itself 
in the “luminosity of its presence” (Derrida OG 49). For Derrida, the very nature of the sign 
leads to a semiosis (or deferral of meaning): the signified (to use Saussure’s terminology) is 
always already deferred by a further signifier and so the ultimate meaning of the sign is always 
out of reach, beyond (transcending) the infinite play (semiosis) of signifiers. Derrida uses Peirce 
as a close ally to help him articulate his notion of semiosis. By referring primarily to Peirce’s 
early semiotic theory (“the doctrine of the thought-sign” (W2: 223)), Derrida shows how Peirce’s 
view that “all thought is in signs” (W2: 207) leads to semiosis: “the representamen functions 
only by giving rise to an interpretant that itself becomes a sign and so on to infinity” (Derrida 
49). Derrida’s point is that, once we admit, as Peirce does, that the universe is “perfused with 
signs—if not composed exclusively of signs” (EP 2.394) and also that “all thought is in signs,” 
then we have no choice but to realize that meaning, in the traditional sense (as “presence” in 
Husserl and “clear and distinct ideas” in Descartes) is unobtainable. In Derrida, we are left only 
with semiosis—the infinite play of signs—and this deferral of meaning is supposed to liberate us 
from the pitfalls of the “logocentric metaphysics of presence” (49). By conceptualizing semiosis 
as play, Derrida urges that philosophers should joyously plunge into the abyss of 
deconstruction—embrace the play of signs rather than try to pursue some ultimate meaning (or 
truth) that transcends the play. 
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 Derrida’s use of Peirce’s “doctrine of the thought-sign” has been investigated by Peirce 
scholars like Umberto Eco, Thomas Short, Vincent Colapietro, Leon Surette, David Pettigrew, 
and Jeffrey Barnouw (to name a few). Whereas scholars like Short, Surette, and Barnouw claim 
that Derrida misappropriates Peirce’s view, others like Colapietro, Eco, and Pettigrew make an 
effort to outline some key similarities between their positions. For example, both Peirce and 
Derrida utilize their theories of signs to challenge traditional accounts of meaning--Derrida 
through critique of the Metaphysics of Presence, and Peirce through critique of Cartesianism 
(Pettigrew 371). Furthermore, Pettigrew argues that, at the moment Peirce and Derrida claim that 
there is no way out of the network of signs, they each (in their own right) “rend the fabric of the 
subject, overturning or decentering the simple self-certainty which would be thought to be at the 
archic center of the self” (Pettigrew 371). Despite these two similarities though, Pettigrew 
suggest that there is one crucial difference between Peirce and Derrida that demands further 
inquiry: that of the “oceanic gap” between, on the one hand, Derrida’s emphasis that semiosis 
leads to play; and, on the other hand, Peirce’s later account of signs which maintains that we can 
still know truths about reality even from within the nexus of signs. While Derrida supposes that 
semiosis stretches out infinitely (and perhaps chaotically) in each direction, Peirce maintains a 
sense of continuity—that signs are tending toward meaning in the long run. While Colapietro 
and Pettigrew offer brief descriptions of this oceanic gap, none have fully traced out why, in 
Peirce, a claim to the continuity of signs is crucial to mitigate against the play in Derrida. 
 My thesis turns on this tension between continuity and play in Derrida and Peirce. By 
further outlining Peirce’s later account of signs, as sketched in his correspondences with Victoria 
Welby, I hope to show that, for Peirce, semiosis does not, as Derrida supposes, result in the 
deferral of meaning, but that rather, one can (and should) maintain the cheerful hope that our 
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collective inquiries will converge in the long-run. To this end, I show that Derrida’s critique of 
the metaphysics of presence functions in Peircean Secondness and that by choosing play over 
continuity Derrida fails to move, as Peirce urges us, into Thirdness. By considering the important 
role that Thirdness plays in Peirce’s semiotic, I reveal how Peirce overcomes the problem of 
semiosis and ends up resisting Derrida’s reading of his earlier semiotic formulation. I suggest 
further, that Peirce’s revisions to his semiotic in his correspondences with Welby is especially 
pertinent today, as it shows us a way out of the post-truth era we find ourselves in (an era that 
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CHAPTER ONE:  
Peirce’s Early Theory of Signs 
…I am, as far as I know, a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and 
opening up what I call semiotic, that is, the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental 
varieties of possible semiosis; and I find the field too vast, the labor too great, for a first-comer. 
—Peirce, EP 2.413 
  
 By the time Peirce died in 1914 he had neither provided a final account of his theory of 
signs, nor published a book dealing specifically with the topic. However, Peirce considered a 
theory of signs to be crucial to underpin his pragmatist tracts and began charting his own account 
as early as 1865 (Short 28). Like a good fallibilist, Peirce continued to revise his theory of signs 
until his eventual death in 1914. Scholars like T.L. Short and Vincent Colapietro have scoured 
Peirce’s writings to reveal the trajectory of Peirce’s reasoning about signs. Particularly, Short 
distinguishes between Peirce’s early and mature theory of signs (Short 27). He suggests, in 
Peirce’s Theory of Signs, that Peirce’s early account is flawed and that much confusion has been 
borne out of scholars failing to note the many revisions that led to Peirce’s mature taxonomy of 
signs (27). Derrida (although he approaches Peirce on his own terms) is guilty of giving birth to 
such confusions. His reading of Peirce in Of Grammatology focuses primarily on Peirce’s early 
semiotic account without considering the resistance that his reading meets when cast against the 
backdrop of Peirce’s later, mature account. In order to ultimately show how, by revisiting 
Peirce’s mature theory of signs, Peirce ends up favouring continuity over Derrida’s play, I first 
need to outline Peirce’s early semiotic account, and provide a detailed description of Derrida’s 
reading/use of that account in Of Grammatology.   
 The primary objective of this first chapter, then, is to sketch Peirce’s early theory of signs 
with enough detail so that the crucial aspects of Derrida’s reading of it can be brought into focus 
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later on. To this end, my aims are threefold: 1) I provide an account of Peirce’s triadic 
formulation of the sign (the fundamental component of Peirce’s theory of signs and the only 
aspect left unchanged throughout his career-spanning inquiry (Short 30)); 2) I show how the 
triadic formulation of the sign folds into Peirce’s three categories of being; and 3) I outline how 
Peirce’s denial of intuition and introspection give rise to the “Doctrine of the Thought-Sign” (the 
view that “all thought is in signs” (W2:207)). Finally, I will conclude the chapter by briefly 
tracing the contours of the problem of semiosis—a problem borne out of the thought-sign. This 
final remark will set the stage for Derrida’s entrance in the following chapter.  
 Since Peirce’s semiotic is far from being fully explored and the terrain daunting to 
traverse (in part due to its incompleteness and in part due to its difficulty), I enlist Short as a 
guide into Peirce’s vast labyrinth of signs. By starting, where Short does, with Peirce’s 1865 
account of thought as representations, I slowly build the context for his triadic formulation of the 
sign, his categories of being, his subsequent “doctrine of the thought-sign,” and the alleged 
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A World of Representations 
  
While Peirce’s early theory of signs is usually attributed to his Doctrine of the Thought-
Sign (as expounded in his Cognition Series of 1868), Short notes that Peirce first began charting 
his theory of signs in 1865, when he was only twenty-five years old (Short 28). In his eighth 
Harvard Lecture titled “Forms of Induction and Hypothesis” Peirce gives a rudimentary account 
of representation1. While only providing a rough sketch, Peirce’s work in this lecture shows that 
he was aware of the important role that representation plays in philosophy, and this is crucial to 
his eventual claim that “all thought is in signs” in the Cognition Series. Here, however, Peirce 
attempts to differentiate his own use of ‘representation’ from Kant’s use of the term Vorstellung 
which Peirce felt limited ‘representation’ solely to mental content (Short 28; W1:257). Instead, 
Peirce wished to broaden the term ‘representation’ so that it applied to “mental contents as well 
as to other things” (Short 28). Peirce writes: 
  I, however, would limit the term [‘representation’] neither to that which is mediate nor to  
 that which is mental, but would use it in its broad, usual, and etymological sense for  
 anything which is supposed to stand for another and which might express that other to a  
 mind which truly could understand it. (W1:257) 
The takeaway from this passage is that Peirce’s use of ‘representation’ more closely resembles 
the German verb Vorstellen which literally means ‘to place before,’ or, as Short claims, “to place 
something before someone or something—hence, to present it” (Short 29). In this way, a 
representation implies an object: the thing out in the world that determines the representation. So, 
a representation, in a sense, is a thought which mediates between an object out in the world and a 
 
1 Peirce would later refer to representations as representamens or signs.  
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further thought that fills the representation with meaning. Notice also that the representation 
expresses its object to “a mind which truly could understand it” (W1:257). The representation, 
then, does not express meaning all on its own, but only once it addresses a mind, or a further 
thought, that gives the representation its meaning.2 In his 1867 “On a New List of Categories” 
Peirce clarifies that ‘representation’ is better understood through examples than by definition. 
Helpfully, he provides a list of instances that best capture his notion of ‘representation’: 
 a word represents a thing to the conception in the mind of the hearer, a portrait represents  
 the person for whom it is intended to the conception of recognition, a weathercock  
 represents the direction of the wind to the conception of him who understands it, a  
 barrister represents his client to the judge and jury whom he influences. (W2:54) 
In each instance, the representation is a thought which stands between an object and a further 
thought that gives the representation its meaning. Peirce claims that “No one can deny that there 
are representations for every thought is one” (W1:257). If every thought is a representation of 
some object to an interpreting mind, then cognition, or the process of thinking, involves 
representation through and through.   
 Consequently, we can only understand the world through representations. “Thus,” Peirce 
claims, “our whole world—that which we can comprehend—is a world of representations” 
(W1:257). Peirce’s point is that there is no way to cut through representation to perceive the 
thing (“that for which a representation might stand prescinded from all that would constitute a 
relation with any representation” (W1:257)), nor is there any way to extrapolate from 
representation to know about the form (“the respect in which a representation might stand for a 
 
2 As I will show in the subsequent section, Peirce revises “the mind that the representation addresses” to 
be an “interpretant.” This distinction between interpretation and interpretant will be crucial toward 
developing Peirce’s triadic formulation of the sign.  
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thing, prescinded from both thing and representation” (W1:257)). This is because, for Peirce, one 
can only “know forms and things through representations” (my emphasis) (W1:257). Appeal 
neither to the form nor to the thing can successfully liberate one from the realm of representation. 
In this way, Peirce’s account of representation counters both the Lockean view that we could 
have immediate access to objects in the world; and the Cartesian view that we can have clear and 
distinct ideas by virtue of the natural light of reason. The whole world is a world of 
representations and one ought to devise a proper method/logic for understanding the world 
through representations. This method is what Peirce would ultimately refer to as his semiotic. 
For the moment that there is thought, there are only representations and representations are really 
just signs. In the subsequent years, Peirce would refine his notion of thought as representation 
and his account of the triadic relation that thought shares with its object and interpretation (or as 
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The Triadic Formulation of the Sign 
  
Peirce’s claims that 1) we live in a world of representations and that 2) our thoughts are 
representations already foreshadows his triadic formulation of the sign. By broadening the scope 
of the term representation, Peirce implies a triadic relationship wherein the representation stands 
for some object out in the world to some interpreting mind. His use of the term representation in 
1865 functions here by playing the role of the ‘sign’ in his triadic formulation: Object-Sign-
Interpretant. Peirce writes that “a sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody 
for something in some respect or capacity” (CP 2.228). The sign stands for an object—some 
external permanency which circumscribes and determines the sign. But the sign needs to address 
something else so that it can be comprehended or interpreted as a sign. Peirce continues that the 
sign “addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or 
perhaps a more developed sign” (Peirce: CP 2.228). That “equivalent” and “more developed 
sign” to which the sign addresses is not an interpretation, but what Peirce calls an interpretant—a 
further thought which arises within someone to give the sign (which is also a thought) its 
meaning. Short writes that the “interpretant, then, is a second representation of the same thing” 
(Short 29). By replacing interpretation with interpretant, Peirce is able to maintain that the 
interpretant, insofar as it is a further thought within the mind of the interpreter, is itself a sign. 
The interpretant, then, is a particular thought within the interpreter, whereas interpretation or 
signification occurs in general—‘interpretation’ is “something embodied in or expressed by any 
number of interpretants” (Short 30). Thus, Short concludes that, for Peirce, the interpretation “is 
general but borne by a particular, the interpretant” (30).  
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 Having replaced representation in his 1865 account with sign, Peirce arrives at what 
Short calls “Peirce’s unchanging conception of a sign as being one of three relata [‘sign’] of a 
single, triadic relation [object-sign-interpretant]” (Short 30). The three relata ‘object,’ ‘sign,’ and 
‘interpretant’ make up the core foundation for Peirce’s theory of signs and this triadic relation 
remains unchanged as Peirce shifts from his early semiotic account to his mature semiotic.  
 In order to understand the upshot of the addition of a third relatum (the interpretant) it 
might be helpful to contrast Peirce’s triadic formulation of the sign against Saussure’s dyadic 
conception of the sign. For Saussure, the sign is composed of a signifier and a signified (a 
“signal” and a “signification” as Saussure first writes in his Course In General Linguistics) 
(Saussure 67). The signifier consists in the “sound-image:” the letters ‘a-r-b-o-r’ which bring to 
mind the signified of the concept tree (67).3 For Saussure, the meaning of a sign is achieved once 
the arbitrary connection between a signifier and signified is brought together to form a sign—
when the word ‘arbor’ presents the concept tree. Saussure’s dyadic formulation of the sign is 
quite different from Peirce’s triadic formulation. Short notes that, for Peirce, “significance is not 
a direct relation of sign to object” as is the case in Saussure’s account of signifier and signified 
(Short 30). “Instead,” Short writes, “the significance of a sign is to be found in its interpretant” 
(30). It is only the third, further, thought [the ‘interpretant’] which arises in the mind of the 
interpreter as “equivalent” to the sign or representamen yet, in some ways, “more developed” 
 
3 It is important to note that I am breaking with the word of Saussure to follow in the footsteps of post-
structuralists in this construal of the signifier. I mean that, for Saussure, the “sound-image” is too material 
of a description for the signifier. In an attempt to make semiology its own discipline, Saussure wants to 
distance himself from any account of the signifier that gives it a material quality (like “sound-image”). In 
this way, he argues that the signifier is purely psychological (ie. has no connection with the empirical 
world): “the two elements involved in the linguistic sign are both psychological and connected in the 
brain by an associative link” (Saussure 66). While this is the case for Saussure, I choose, instead, to think 
of the signifier as many post-structuralists do: as something resembling a sign-vehicle (ie. not entirely 
psychological).   
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that gives the sign its significance. Short writes that “the sign signifies its object only via being 
so interpreted” by an interpretant (Short 30). This point harkens back to Peirce’s insistence in 
1865 that a representation needs to address a mind (or more precisely an interpretant) in order to 
be comprehended as a sign. Without an interpretant, that is, a sign cannot be understood as a 
sign.  
 In this way, there are two respects in which the triadic formulation of the ‘sign’ gives rise 
to significance (or meaning). In the first respect, Short writes that the “sign mediates between 
object and interpretant” (30). Here, the sign mediates by standing for its object to an interpretant. 
The sign (of a weathercock blowing) stands for the object (the direction of the wind) to the 
interpretant (that the wind is blowing North). In the second respect, Short says, “the interpretant 
mediates between sign and object” (30). The interpretant brings a kind of reconciliation to the 
sign and its object—furnishes our acquaintance with the object via the sign. It, in a sense, 
reconciles the connection between an object out in the world (the direction of the wind) and the 
sign in the mind of the beholder (of the weathercock caught in the wind). The interpretant, 
insofar as it is both “equivalent” to the sign yet still “more developed,” supplies the meaning of 
the object’s sign to the mind of the beholder. In this way, the significance, or meaning, of the 
sign is found in the interpretant, yet always consists in the triadic relation of Object-Sign-
Interpretant.  
  Following Peirce’s move in the “New List of Categories” to provide examples of 
representation rather than an abstract definition, it would be helpful to outline a few examples of 
how the triadic relation of object-sign-interpretant functions in practice. I have already provided 
one of Peirce’s favourite examples (that of the weathercock caught in the wind), although it 
would be helpful to consider another example to drive the point home. In his introduction to 
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Peirce on Signs, James Hoopes uses the example of a stop sign to outline how the triadic relation 
of the sign functions. Hoopes claims that, for Peirce, a sign “receives its meaning by being 
interpreted by a subsequent thought or action” (Hoopes 7). This subsequent thought, of course, is 
the interpretant. He asks the reader to imagine that they are traveling in an automobile and 
eventually come to a stop sign at an intersection. The stop sign is a real object out in the world. 
Its post is made of metal and is strong enough to hold up the red octagon featuring the white 
markings S-T-O-P. While the actual object (the stop sign in the brute thrust of reality) surely 
exists, the driver of the automobile does not immediately perceive the object, or stop sign, in 
itself.4 Rather, the driver’s perception is mediated via the sign of its object. But that sign, or 
representation, does not contain the significance of the stop sign—does not entail what it means 
to stop. Hoopes claims that it is “only in relation to a subsequent thought—an interpretant—that 
the sign attains meaning” (Hoopes 7). So, the driver has a sign of the stop sign (object) in their 
mind and that sign addresses a further thought: the interpretant. Thus, Hoopes claims that “the 
meaning lies not in the [driver’s] perception but in the interpretation of the perception as a signal 
to stop or, better still, in the act of stopping” (Hoopes 7). Hoopes emphasis on “the act of 
stopping” is especially pertinent. It suggests that the interpretant does not just have to take the 
form of a further thought, but it can also take the form of a thought carried out in an action, or 
habit. The driver notices the sign on the road, understands the rules of the road, and values their 
 
4 There may be a worry here that Hoopes is making Peirce out to be more of a Kantian than he actually is. 
I am not suggesting that there is a lacuna between perception and reality—Peirce’s doctrine of synechism 
maintains that there is not such a gap between perception and reality. This description, by Hoopes, seems 
to stem from Peirce’s test for the blindspot on the retina (I will get to this later). In the case of the test for 
the blindspot on the retina, Peirce is dealing with perception. His conclusion is that the very fact that there 
is a blindspot on the retina shows, by our anatomy, that we do not immediately perceive the objects of our 
conception, but that, rather, the mind fills in the blind spot. That there is this blindspot, seems to suggest 
that we are dealing with representations and not the things in themselves. Though this blindspot should 
not lead us to believe that there is a gap or abyss or space between perception and reality.  
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safety. When addressed by the sign of the stop sign, the driver promptly stops. The interpretant 
of the sign is fulfilled in the action of the driver stopping.  
 Similarly, I might question whether the fire burning on the wick of the candle next to my 
computer is hot. I might put this question to the test by holding my finger inside the flame. Ouch! 
The interpretant—that the fire is very hot indeed—arises in the action of me pulling my hand 
away. However, the interpretant that the candle flame is hot could also be fulfilled by my 
performing and inductive inference from the time I fell beside a campfire as a child, or when I 
doubted my mother’s testimony that I should stay away from the wood fireplace at Grandma’s 
house. The point is that the interpretant, for Peirce, sometimes takes the form of an action. Every 
time, however, the interpretant functions both as the subsequent thought addressed by the sign 
which stands for its object and as a reconciliation of the relationship between the sign and its 
object. “Thus,” Hoopes writes, “the meaning of every thought is established by a triadic relation: 
an interpretation of the thought as a sign of a determining object” (Hoopes 7). Every instance of 
thought, and so thought in general, consists in this triadic relationship of object-sign-interpretant. 
The ‘sign’ stands for an ‘object’ to its ‘interpretant.’ The weathercock, taken by a gust, stands for 
the direction of the wind to the trained mind who observes it. Fire is hot to the hand that touches 
it. And the apple rotting in Gregor Samsa’s back is a sign to his father that he is still a member of 
the family (Kafka 110).  
 As Peirce remarks later in his life: the “universe is perfused with signs, if it is not 
composed exclusively of signs” (EP 2.394). With the claim that the “universe is perfused with 
signs” one might go back to revise Peirce’s point in 1865 that “our whole world—that which we 
can comprehend—is a world of representations” (W1:257). Instead, our whole world—that 
which we can comprehend—is a world of signs. More precisely, perhaps, it is a world composed 
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of triadic relations between objects, signs, and interpretants. It is only by reasoning in (and 
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The Three Categories of Being 
  
In order to provide a final clarification of the triadic formulation of the sign, I turn to 
Peirce’s 1894 essay “What is a Sign?”. Here Peirce accomplishes two key philosophical moves. 
First, he provides an illustrative example of how his triadic formulation of the sign folds into his 
categories of being: Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. Second, he provides an account of 
three classifications of the sign: icons, indexes, and symbols. I tend to each of these points 
briefly now and will circle back around to them in my final chapter when I take up Peirce’s 
mature semiotic as a response to Derrida’s notion of play.  
 Peirce’s categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are notorious for being 
difficult to grasp. Even Short refrains from delving too deeply into Peirce’s “New List of 
Categories” worrying that doing so would be cause of great confusion (Short  31). Despite their 
difficulty, however, the categories play an integral role in underpinning Peirce’s triadic 
formulation of the sign. Each component of the triadic sign corresponds to one of Peirce’s three 
categories. Without wishing to proceed too far into the deep chambers of Peirce’s categories, I 
need to at least acknowledge the important role that the categories play in Peirce’s semiotic. To 
do so, I limit my discussion of the categories to the few paragraphs that begin Peirce’s “What is a 
Sign?”.  
 Peirce begins the essay with a thought experiment that helps to explain his categories of 
being. First, he invites the reader to imagine a person who is caught up in a dreamy state. Peirce 
claims:  
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 Let us suppose he is thinking of nothing but a red colour. Not thinking about it, either,  
 that is, not asking nor answering any questions about it, not even saying to himself that it  
 pleases him, but just contemplating it, as his fancy brings it up. (EP 2.4) 
The dreamer has only a red colour in his mind. He is not thinking about the colour (more so 
feeling it), yet the colour is all that occupies his contemplation (and ‘contemplation’ might not be 
the right word because it entails a kind of thinking which is not yet present in this First). He is in 
a half-waking state. It is difficult to explain what Peirce means by such a half-waking state 
because you “cannot touch it without spoiling it” (W6:171). By today’s standards, we might 
imagine that the dreamer is “zoned out” or in an alpha state (as when I am driving down a 
familiar road and, for a moment, zone out and forget that I am driving). Peirce writes that “this is 
about as near as may be to a state of mind in which something is present, without compulsion 
and without reason; it is called Feeling” (EP 2.4 ). This state of pure feeling—independent of a 
causal origin and independent of external stimulus—is an example of Firstness. Firstness can 
“only be a possibility” (Peirce: CP 1.25). It involves a kind of spontaneity and indeterminacy. 
The dreamer only feels a “sensation”5 of the colour red—it has not come from an external 
stimulus, nor has he yet thought about the colour. Peirce claims that humans are rarely ever in a 
state of pure feeling or Firstness. Sooner or later, reality impinges on us. It is difficult to remain a 
dreamer.  
 
5 I put sensation in scare quotes because it is not really a sensation which, by definition, occurs when a 
body bumps up against something. There is no external stimulus in this feeling of sensation. I am 
struggling to find the right word, but there is no right word to describe this state of firstness—to put 
firstness into words is already to “spoil it”—it would be to bring the First into relation with a Second. For 
the time being, I cannot frame this category of being Firstness in any technical way. However, in the final 
chapter, I return to Peirce’s categories and offer a more technical definition of Firstness that might help 
shed some light on this category which, at the present, is difficult to frame. We must start at the shallow 
end, and slowly make our way into the deep.  
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 Hence, Peirce continues his thought experiment: the dreamer is at once startled by the 
shrill and prolonged sound of a steam whistle. The steam whistle irritates the dreamer and 
shatters his pure feeling of the colour red. He instinctually brings his hands to his ears in an 
attempt to drown out the sound. This action, of course, is compulsive. The whistle is an example 
of reality impinging on the dreamer—causing him to break his concentration by bringing his 
hands to his ears. Peirce argues: 
 This sense of acting and of being acted upon, which is our sense of the reality of things, – 
 both of outward things and of ourselves, – may be called the sense of Reaction. It does  
 not reside in any one Feeling; it comes upon the breaking of one feeling by another  
 feeling. It essentially involves two things acting upon one another. (EP 2.4-5) 
The dreamer is faced with the brute thrust of reality—secondness. The second comes to break the 
feeling of the first—replaces the peaceful contemplation of red with the shrill sound of the steam 
whistle. Secondness does not occur in the steam whistle, but importantly, in the rupture of, or 
break of, the feeling of the colour red with the sound of the steam whistle. The dreamer has 
awakened, so to speak; but he is still not thinking.  
 Peirce continues: the dreamer “jumps up and seeks to make his escape by the door, which 
we will suppose had been blown to with a bang just as the whistle commenced” (EP 2.5). 
However, as the dreamer opens the door, the steam whistle stops. Satisfied that the noise has 
stopped, the dreamer decides to close the door and return to his dreamy half-waking state 
“contemplating” (again, in scare quotes) the colour red. Just as the door closes, though, the sound 
recommences. Here, the dreamer begins to wonder whether his opening the door caused the 
whistle to stop. He decides to open the door once more. Sure enough, the whistle stops again. 
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Peirce claims that the dreamer “is now in a third state of mind: he is Thinking” (EP 2.5). Peirce 
clarifies:  
That is, he is aware of learning, or of going through a process by which a phenomenon is 
found to be governed by a rule, or has a general knowable way of behaving. He finds that 
one action is the means, or middle, for bringing about another result. (EP 2.5) (my 
emphasis) 
Through a process of thinking the dreamer comes to know that the steam whistle is caused by the 
closing of the door. The action of his opening the door is a means, or middle, for bringing about 
the result of the whistle stopping. The man understands that the whistle’s blowing is governed by 
a general law: that when the door is closed, the whistle sounds; and when the door is opened, the 
whistles ceases. This general law, or Thirdness, arises to govern the Reaction brought about by a 
particular Secondness—the whistle first impinging on the dreamer. The notion of the 
government of Thirdness is especially important—just as a government governs its populace, so 
too does Thirdness (insofar as it is a law) govern the forces at play in the universe. Gravity 
governs objects that are dropped; the door’s position governs whether or not the whistle 
commences. Now, one could be content to remain in Secondness and only acknowledge the clash 
of the train whistle impinging on the dreamer contemplating red. To do so, however, would be to 
deny the import of Thirdness—that beyond this particular instance of Secondness there lies a 
general law (which is real) that serves to govern the action and reaction of Secondness.  
 So, while Firstness is understood only as possibility, Secondness arises in the reaction of 
two things—in the brute thrust of a Second clashing with a First. Thirdness, on the other hand, 
suggests that the reaction or clash of particular Seconds are governed by real laws or norms in 
general. Peirce writes:  
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In the second there was only a sense of brute force; now there is a sense of government 
by a general rule. In Reaction only two things are involved; but in government there is a 
third thing which is a means to an end. (EP 2.5) 
For example, the weathercock is caught by a gust of wind. In Secondness, the observer only 
recognizes the instance of the weathercock changing direction—of the wind forcefully moving 
the pointer in one way or another. However, in Thirdness, the observer realizes that the 
weathercock pointing in a new direction is indicative of a change in the direction of the wind at 
that given time. Furthermore, in Thirdness, the observer realizes that the weathercock is 
generally governed by the following norm: that whenever it is caught by a gust of wind, it points 
in the direction that the wind is blowing. It is only in Thirdness that the observer can begin to use 
the weathercock—a farmer can use the weathercock as a tool that helps determine whether or not 
to spray pesticides on her crop (if the wind is blowing in the wrong direction, she might end up 
poisoning her livestock).  
 To return to the triadic formulation of the sign, each of the three relata can be understood 
as corresponding to one of the three categories. The sign (or representamen) can be understood 
through Firstness, the object through Secondness, and the interpretant through Thirdness. The 
sign is a first because it carries with it a kind of indeterminacy and spontaneity. Recall, Hoopes 
describes the triadic relation as “an interpretation of the thought as a sign of a determining 
object” (Hoopes 7). The sign is, in a sense, determined by its object, but there are degrees of 
indeterminacy involved in the way in which the sign relates to its interpretant. The sheer 
interpretability of the sign leaves open the possibility of error on the part of the interpretant—an 
indeterminacy which makes possible an array of interpretants. The object is a Second because it 
impinges on and circumscribes the sign—it limits the sign insofar as the sign is determined by it. 
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The interpretant is a Third, then, because it functions to govern the relationship between sign and 
object (Firstness and Secondness)—is the middle which furnishes our acquaintance with the 
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The Three Classifications of the Sign 
  
Peirce’s categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness cut deeper than this, though. 
In “What is a Sign?” he muses that “a regular progression of one, two, three may be remarked in 
the three orders of signs, Likeness, Index, Symbol” (EP 2.9). Here, Peirce is mentioning how his 
categories further inform his three primary classifications of the sign.6 Likenesses, or icons as 
they are sometimes called, “serve to convey ideas of the things they represent simply by 
imitating them”—it is the appearance of a sign as it is in itself, prescinded from any object or 
Secondness (EP 2.5). One of Peirce’s favourite examples of likenesses are photographs. A 
photograph is an iconic 1:1 imitation of the thing being photographed. In this way, it is only a 
likeness of that thing. However, this example is not quite precise. As Peirce notes, at least in his 
time, photographs are produced “under such circumstances that they were physically forced to 
correspond point by point to nature” (EP 2.6). In this way, there does seem to be a connection7 
between the photograph and the thing being photographed which suggests that, in some ways, a 
photograph can also be understood as an indication, or indicative sign. This point is minor, but it 
does show that, for Peirce, the same sign can be in one sense an icon, while in another sense an 
indication. For the purpose of providing an example of a pure likeness then, we might imagine a 
digitally rendered image—one conjured by computer-generating software that does not share an 
indicative relationship with the thing being photographed. Consider the following image of a 
wheel: 
 
6 While, in his early semiotic account, Peirce concludes that there are only three classifications of signs, 
in his mature semiotic, he suggests there are 64 different types of signs.  
7 Often times when Peirce writes connection he spells it: “connexion”. I was told to omit this spelling, but 
I want to point out that the “nex” in Peirce’s connexion seems to suggest a connection within a nexus. 
Perhaps, then, Peirce uses this spelling deliberately when speaking of signs so as to account for 
connections taking place within the nexus of signs. 








Peirce suggests that, while the image denotes a wheel, “it leaves the spectator uncertain whether 
it is a copy of something actually existing or a mere play of fancy” (EP 2.7). The uncertainty 
involved in this example shows that, for Peirce, likenesses persist in the mode of being, 
Firstness. He claims:  
 The likeness has no dynamical connection with the object it represents; it simply happens 
 that its qualities resemble those of that object, and excite analogous sensations in the  
 mind for which it is a likeness. But it really stands unconnected with them. (EP 2.9)  
Insofar as a likeness stands unconnected with an object, it is an instance of Firstness; and it is an 
instance of Firstness insofar as it has yet to come into reaction with a Second.  
 Next, there are indications, or indices. Indications are signs that “show something about 
things, on account of their being physically connected with them” (EP 2.5). An example of an 
indicative sign is that of the weathercock caught in the wind. There is a physical connection 
between the weathercock and the wind that serves to indicate which direction the wind is 
blowing. Similarly, a man with a rolling gait “is a probable indication that he is a sailor,” smoke 
is indicative of fire, and the sweat on my arm is indicative of my skin being porous (EP 2.8). For 
Peirce, the indicative sign corresponds with Secondness. He writes that “the index is physically 
connected with its object; they make an organic pair” (EP 2.9). That is, an indicative sign always 
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that “the interpreting mind has nothing to do with this connection, except remarking it, after it is 
established” (EP 2.9). This point is important as it suggests that, regardless of the interpreter’s 
interpretation of the indicative sign, that connection will always be the same. A weathercock will 
always point in the direction of the wind regardless of whether or not the interpreter recognizes 
that it does. The interpreting mind does not have the power to will the indicative sign to be 
indicative of something else—they may try, but if they do, it will only be an instance of 
misinterpretation through ignorance or error.  
 Lastly, there are symbols. Symbols, or general signs, “have become associated with their 
meanings by usage” (EP 2.5). For example, the stop sign described above is a symbol. Not that 
particular stop sign; but stop signs in general. Through the usage of stop signs it has become 
commonly agreed by all who know the symbol, that a stop sign is a sign to stop. There are thus 
certain conventions surrounding the symbol that inform its use. Peirce continues: a symbol 
“cannot indicate any particular thing; it denotes a kind of thing. Not only that, but it is itself a 
kind and not a single thing” (EP 2.9). Since symbols are general, they do not encompass the 
convention of a particular thing in the world at time t, but all instances of those particular things 
across time. For example, Peirce claims that  
you can write down the word “star”; but that does not make you the creator of the word, 
nor if you erase it have you destroyed the word. The word lives in the minds of those who 
use it [and the word is general in this sense]. (EP 2.9-10) 
 In this way, “A symbol, once in being, spreads among the peoples. In use and in experience, its 
meaning grows” (EP 2.10).  
Unlike indications (which do not depend on the mind of the interpreter), “the symbol is 
connected with its object by virtue of the idea of the symbol-using mind, without which no such 
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connection would exist” (EP 2.9). Thus, insofar as a symbol’s meaning depends on how it is 
used, the symbol requires, and in some sense, is made, through its use by symbol-using minds. A 
stop sign means nothing to someone who has never encountered one before. As such, symbols 
relate to Thirdness. They denote the common laws and norms that govern the use of a sign.  
 For Peirce, “we think only in signs” (EP 2.10). In all cases of reasoning, then, “we have 
to use a mixture of likenesses, indices, and symbols” (EP 2.10). We cannot afford to do away 
with any of them—they each play important roles in the process of reasoning. Peirce explains 
how each classification of signs affect reasoning with the following metaphor (which I will quote 
in full to capture the vivacity of his prose):  
…though a man may be said to be composed of living tissues, yet portions of his nails, 
teeth, hair, and bones, which are most necessary to him, have ceased to undergo the 
metabolic processes which constitute life, and there are liquids in his body which are not 
alive. Now, we may liken the indices we use in reasoning to the hard parts of the body, 
and the likenesses we use to the blood: the one holds us stiffly up to the realities, the 
other with its swift changes supplies the nutriment for the main body of thought. (EP 
2.10) 
Together, the indices and likenesses merge to form symbols—make up the whole body of 
thought. They, in a way, carry the mind from one point to another. The whole art of reasoning 
then, consists in “the art of marshalling such signs” and only through tending to such signs can 
one ever hope to obtain the truth (EP 2.10).  
 Peirce’s categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are thus woven together with 
his triadic formulation of the sign and his three primary classifications of the sign: likenesses, 
indications, and symbols. Peirce’s insistence that his semiotic is closely related to his categories 
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is indicative of him being one of the great philosophical systematizers—he is trying to build his 
theory of signs out of the foundations provided by his three categories of being. For now, this 
rudimentary sketch of the relationship between Peirce’s semiotic and his categories will suffice.  
 I will return to the categories once again in the final chapter, to hone my Peircean upshot 
against Derrida. In the meantime, however, there is one crucial point that requires further 
explication. Namely, that we think only in signs. The point is hinted at by Peirce in the passage 
quoted above, but the reasoning done to support that claim occurred a number of years prior, in 
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The Doctrine of the Thought-Sign  
  
The Cognition Series is composed of three essays: “Questions Concerning Certain 
Faculties Claimed For Man,” “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” and “Grounds of 
Validity of the Laws of Logic.” For the purpose of the present investigation, I limit my scope to 
consider the first two essays most closely. In them, Peirce elaborates his Doctrine of the 
Thought-Sign: that we think only in signs, or more precisely, that the process of cognition is 
semiotic at its core. In the first essay, “Questions” (for short), Peirce asks a series of questions 
that aim to challenge some of the core assumptions of Cartesian and Kantian philosophy: 
namely, that the mental faculty is furnished with the powers of intuition and introspection. His 
investigation reveals four incapacities:  
 1. We have no power of Introspection, but all knowledge of the internal world is derived  
       by hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of external facts. 
 2. We have no power of Intuition, but every cognition is determined logically by previous 
      cognitions. 
 3. We have no power of thinking without signs. 
 4. We have no conception of the absolutely incognizable. (W2: 213) 
In the second essay, “Some Consequences” (for short), Peirce traces the consequences of these 
four incapacities. In what follows, I both briefly outline Peirce’s denials of introspection and 
intuition and elaborate his view that all thought is in signs. I further show how the conclusion 
that all thought is in signs leads to the Doctrine of the Thought-Sign, which implies, in its 
infancy, the problem of an infinite deferral of meaning, or semiosis (and this is precisely the 
aspect of Peirce that Derrida uses to arrive at his de-construction of the transcendental signified).   
 In “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man,” Peirce ultimately 
concludes that “all thought is in signs that have no immediate content but require a subsequent 
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thought, an interpretant, to give them meaning by interpreting them as representations” (Hoopes 
34) (my emphasis). That is, for Peirce, not only is the entire universe composed of signs, but 
cognition is semiotic at its core, rooted in the categories, and can be understood through the 
triadic formulation of the sign.  
 Before I get to Peirce’s claim that all thought is in signs, I will first give an account of 
Peirce’s denial of the faculties of intuition and introspection. Indeed, Peirce’s four incapacities 
function, separately, to critique some aspects of both the Kantian and Cartesian edifice which 
ruled philosophy in his time.  
 Peirce begins “Questions” by asking: 
 Whether by the simple contemplation of a cognition, independently of any previous  
 knowledge and without reasoning from signs, we are enabled rightly to judge whether  
 that cognition has been determined by a previous cognition or whether it refers   
 immediately to its object? (W2: 193)  
This question deals, primarily, with intuition in the Kantian sense (Peirce notes that his target is 
Kantian intuition in the lengthily footnote found at the bottom of W2: 193). However, Peirce 
targets both Kant and Descartes’ view of intuition. So we will see how Peirce switches targets 
when he moves from a critique of Kantian intuition in the first question, to a critique of Cartesian 
intuition in the second question. An intuition, for Peirce (as for Kant), is “a cognition not 
determined by a previous cognition of the same object, and therefore so determined by 
something outside of consciousness” (W2: 193). More precisely, Peirce claims that an intuition 
is a cognition “determined directly by the transcendental object” (W2: 194). We must keep this 
precise definition of intuition in mind, if we are to follow Peirce’s train of thought.  
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 The first question asks whether we can distinguish between an immediate cognition of 
the transcendental object (as in the case of an intuition) and one determined by previous 
cognitions. More clearly, Peirce wonders whether we can intuitively know that our cognition is 
an intuition and not a cognition determined by previous ones: can we intuitively distinguish 
between an intuition and a cognition determined by previous cognitions? Peirce suggests that it 
often feels as though we can; but further investigation will show that this feeling is only a kind of 
trickery (W2: 194). In short, Peirce’s answer is no: we have no power of distinguishing between 
intuitions and non-intuitions. In order to show this, he proves that, contra Kant’s theory, space is 
not intuited, but rather, is filled in by the work of intellect.  
 The most vivid test Peirce provides for this incapacity is the test for the blind spot on the 
retina. Here, Peirce urges the reader to turn the journal on its side, place one coin on each end of 
the paper, cover the left eye and stare at the coin on left with the right eye, then move the coin on 
the right towards the center of journal. Once the coin (from the right) reaches about the center of 
the journal, it will disappear from sight. “It follows” Peirce says “that the space we immediately 
see (when one eye is closed) is not, as we had imagined, a continuous oval, but is a ring, the 
filling up of which must be the work of the intellect” (W2: 197). In this way, we do not perceive 
an immediate intuition of the outside world (the world is not transparent to us; space is not 
intuited), but rather, by our anatomy, we make an inference about what the world is like—the 
intellect, in this way, aids in the construction of space. The blind spot on the retina shows that, 
since we cannot immediately perceive the object, we are already dealing with a representation, or 
sign of the object. This does not, however, mean that the object is separated from us by an abyss. 
The object determines the sign, and so is intimately and synechistically connected with the object 
that it is a sign of.  
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 Having reasoned that we cannot distinguish between intuitions and cognitions determined 
by previous cognitions, Peirce concludes we are not able to immediately intuit the transcendental 
object. All thought, it seems then, is mediated through signs composed of triadic relations.  
Having dealt with Kant, Peirce moves to his second question: “Whether we have an 
intuitive self-consciousness?” (W2: 200); and his third question: “whether we have an intuitive 
power of distinguishing between the subjective elements of different kinds of cognitions?” (W2: 
204). These questions challenge the Cartesian view of intuition more broadly. In the second 
question, Peirce challenges Descartes’ view that we could have intuitive access to our self-
consciousness—that we could know, by an intuition alone, that we exist. To do so, he shows how 
our sense of self does not arise from the cogito, but rather, from ignorance and error.  
 By self-consciousness, Peirce means “knowledge of ourselves”—“not a mere feeling of 
subjective conditions of consciousness, but of our personal selves” (W2: 200-201). Peirce admits 
that he is well aware that he exists. The question is: “how does Peirce knows he exists?” Is it by 
a “special intuitive faculty, or is it determined by previous cognitions?” (W2: 201). To answer 
this question, Peirce undergoes a thought experiment about how children come to know that they 
exist. 
 Peirce begins by stating that “it is almost impossible to assign a period at which children 
do not already exhibit decided intellectual activity in directions in which thought is indispensable 
to their well-being” (W2: 201). From a child’s point of view, the body begins as the most 
important thing in the universe. Peirce claims that “only what it touches has any actual or present 
feeling; only what it faces has any actual colour; only what is on its tongue has any actual taste” 
(W2: 201). In this way, a child does not think of herself as hearing the toy sound, but of the toy 
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as sounding. This disposition, however, gradually changes as the child comes to interact with the 
outside world. 
 Eventually, Peirce says, the child is endowed with language, learns to speak, and 
communicate—to express her desires (W2: 202). It is around this time, Peirce thinks, she comes 
to regard “testimony as an even stronger mark of fact than appearances themselves” (W2: 202). 
So, Peirce writes:  
 A child hears it said that the stove is hot. But it is not, [she] says; and, indeed, that  
 central  body is not touching it, and only what that touches is hot or cold. But she touches  
 it, and finds the testimony confirmed in a striking way. Thus, she becomes aware of  
 ignorance, and it is necessary to suppose a self in which this ignorance can inhere. So  
 testimony gives the first dawning of self-consciousness. (W2: 202)   
In this way, we do not become aware of our self-consciousness by some intuitive mental faculty. 
Contra Descartes, the cogito does not situate the ego. Rather, we learn of our self-consciousness 
through ignorance and error, by supposing a “self which is fallible” (W2: 203). In this way, there 
is “no necessity of supposing an intuitive self-consciousness, since self-consciousness may easily 
be the result of inference” (W2: 204). Hence, Peirce shifts from a critique of Kant to a critique of 
Descartes, challenging, in each thrust, some key aspects of the respective thinker’s views about 
intuition.  
 For the present investigation, I will not here delve too deeply into Peirce’s answer to his 
third question: “whether we have an intuitive power of distinguishing between the subjective 
elements of different kinds of cognitions?” (W2: 204). Peirce, rather quickly, dismisses this 
intuitive power. Suffice it to say that Peirce denies that we have the intuitive power to distinguish 
between the subjective elements of different kinds of cognitions. Roughly, this means that we do 
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not need to suppose such a subjective intuitive power. Peirce remarks that the objective feature 
of a cognition relates to its immediate object;8 while the subjective feature relates to “some 
action or passion of the self whereby it becomes represented” (W2: 204). We can, Peirce thinks, 
rightfully distinguish between such things as sense and imagination based on the difference 
between their immediate objects alone, without needing to posit an additional subjective intuitive 
power: 
 …the very fact of the immense difference in the immediate objects of sense and   
 imagination, sufficiently accounts for our distinguishing those faculties; and instead of  
 being an argument in favour of the existence of an intuitive power of distinguishing the  
 subjective elements of consciousness, it is a powerful reply to any such argument, so far  
 as the distinction of sense and imagination is concerned. (W2: 205) 
Thus, Peirce finds no reason to suppose a special intuitive faculty to mark these distinctions. 
 These first three questions combine to make up Peirce’s denial of the power of intuition 
as found in both Kant and Descartes. For Peirce then, we have no faculty of intuition because 1) 
we cannot distinguish between an intuition and a cognition determined by previous cognitions, 2) 
we have no intuitive access to our self-consciousness, but knowledge of our mental lives stems 
from testimony and error; and 3) we have no intuitive ability to distinguish between the 
subjective elements of different kinds of cognitions. 
 Peirce’s fourth question turns his focus to introspection. Peirce asks “Whether we have 
any power of introspection, or whether our whole knowledge of the internal world is derived 
from the observation of external facts?” (W2: 205). Peirce says that there are certain facts that 
are often regarded as external and others that are often regarded as internal. “The question is,” he 
 
8 In the final chapter, I will show how the immediate object is apart of the triadic formulation of the sign.  
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muses, “whether the latter [internal facts] are known otherwise than by inference from the former 
[external facts]?” (W2: 205-206). Peirce describes introspection as the ability to have a “direct 
perception of the internal world” (W2: 206). This definition of introspection seems to echo the 
Cartesian view that we can have direct and transparent access to the narrow contents of our 
mental states. In order to firmly oppose Descartes and show that we have no power of 
introspection, Peirce first begins with the example of seeing the colour red. Peirce claims that it 
is often thought there is an internal element to our sensations. He argues those who believe this 
understand that “the sensation of redness is as it is, owing to the constitution of the mind; and in 
this sense it is a sensation of something internal” (W2: 206). Contrarily, Peirce suggests that 
“that knowledge would, in fact, be an inference from redness as a predicate of something 
external,” not as a sensation of something internal (W2: 206).  
Peirce wants to extend this reasoning to mental states like emotions. Traditionally, it is 
thought that emotions do not arise as predicates, but are referable to the mind alone, such that we 
can have knowledge of the emotions without inference from external facts. However, Peirce 
argues that: 
if a man is angry, his anger implies, in general, no determinate and constant character in 
its object… on the other hand… there is some relative character in the outward thing 
which makes him angry, and a little reflection will serve to show that his anger consists 
in his saying to himself, "this thing is vile, abominable, etc." and that it is rather a mark of 
returning reason to say, "I am angry.” (W2: 206) 
Peirce’s example outlines that even the emotions (typically thought of as purely internal states) 
are inferences from the external world. The man realizing he is angry, is the conclusion to the 
premise: his saying “this thing is vile”. What is often mistaken as introspection, then, is simply 
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an inference from facts about the external world. In this way, even introspection is mediated by 
representations, and this leads Peirce to propose his view of the semiotic mind.  
 We arrive, finally, at the most important question: “whether we can think without signs?” 
(W2: 207). Peirce forcefully argues that “if we seek the light of external facts9, the only cases of 
thought which we can find are of thought in signs” (W2: 207). Since thought can only be known 
by reference to external facts, and since, by the blind spot on the retina, our knowledge of 
external facts take semiotic form, “the only thought, then, which can possibly be cognized is 
thought in signs” (W2: 207). And further, since “thought which cannot be cognized [such as 
intuitions and introspections] does not exist” it follows that all thought “must necessarily be in 
signs” (W2: 207). One can understand Peirce as arguing that, if we have no faculty of intuition or 
introspection, then all thoughts are interpreted as/in signs, and this is necessarily the case. 
Furthermore, Peirce argues that “from the proposition that every thought is a sign, it follows that 
every thought must address itself to some other, must determine some other, since that is the 
essence of a sign” (W2: 207). Continuing, in his subsequent essay, “Some Consequences,” 
Peirce claims that “there is absolutely no first cognition of any object, but cognition arises by a 
continuous process” (W2: 214). That we think in signs, taken in conjunction with the fact that all 
cognitions rise from a continuous process, gives rise to a conception of cognition as a continuous 
process of signs that point to other signs. Each thought we have addresses a further thought, and 
so on, and so on ad infinitum. In this way, for Peirce, “every thought must be interpreted in 
another” (W2: 208). In other words, there can be “no cognition not determined by a previous 
cognition,” no sign which does not point to another sign (W2: 209).   
 
9 Notice Peirce’s subtle play on words here, referencing Descartes’ seeking the natural light of reason.  
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 Consciousness, then, is semiotic in nature, and takes the form of what Peirce calls a 
“thought-sign” (W2: 223).  The “thought-sign” consists in life as a train of thought—“each 
former thought suggests something to the thought which follows it, i.e., is the sign of something 
to this latter” (W2: 223). As Short points out, the “thought-sign” is both an infinite “progressus” 
and an infinite “regressus” (Short 34). Cognition involves an infinite progressus because, as I 
have previously shown, every thought, being a sign, must address itself to a subsequent “more 
developed” interpretant (CP 2.228). This interpretant, then, becomes a sign that addresses 
another interpretant which itself becomes a sign and so on ’til death. The thought-sign involves 
an infinite regressus then, because, at the same time that thought stretches out infinitely into the 
future, it also traces back infinitely to the beginning—the first cognition. But since, as Peirce 
argues above, there is no first cognition of the object, there is no way to arrive at an immediate 
conception of it. So, Short says each thought-sign is both “a sign that interprets the preceding 
thought-sign that determines it, and it is a sign interpreted in the succeeding thought-sign that it 
determines” (Short 34). Given Peirce’s denial of intuition and introspection, he has no choice but 
to accept that a sequence of thought stretches infinitely in each direction. “Otherwise,” Short 
notes, “we come to an intuition at one end or to a self-explanatory thought at the other end” 
(Short 35). Thought thus “stretches infinitely in both directions, toward the past and toward the 
future” (Short 34). Though it is important to note that, by infinity of thought, Peirce has a 
continuum in mind. That is, similarly to how “an infinity of real numbers are packed into the 
finite interval between 0 and 1, so also an infinity of thoughts may be packed into a finite period 
of consciousness10” (Short 35). As such, Peirce claims that “there is no exception, therefore, to 
 
10 One can think of the “0” in this continuum as being the thing in-itself. Peirce calls this “the ideal first, 
which is quite singular, and quite out of consciousness. The ideal first is the particular thing-in-itself. It 
does not exist as such” (Peirce W2:238). It does not exist as such because we can have no pure intuition 
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the law that every thought-sign is translated or interpreted in a subsequent one, unless it be that 
all thought comes to an abrupt and final end in death” (W2: 224). Without the powers of intuition 
or introspection, all mental action takes the form of the thought-sign—all cognition is 
















of it, only a representation of it mediated through signs. The “1” in this continuum, then, can be thought 
of as reality. As Peirce describes, reality is an “ens such as would stand in the long run. The real, then, is 
that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore 
independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus the very origin of the conception of reality show that this 
conception essentially involves the notion of a community, without definite limits” (W2: 239). So, the 
thought-sign stands between, on the one hand, the thing-in-itself, and on the other hand, reality. As 
inquiry progresses, we slowly approximate back toward the thing-in-itself (though never actually reach it) 
and simultaneously forward toward a conception of reality that is in signs (though never actually reach it) 
(Short 37). 
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Semiosis and the Crisis of Meaning 
  
So far, I have provided an outline of Peirce’s early account of signs by trying to trace the 
drift of his thought about signs. I have shown, through Short and Hoopes, how his early work on 
representation is the first dawning that leads to his ultimate conclusions that both: 1) the universe 
is composed entirely of signs; and 2) that all thought is necessarily in signs. I further outlined 
how, unlike for Saussure, Peirce’s semiotic consists in the triadic relation of object-sign-
interpretant. I also showed that each relatum of the triadic formulation is grounded in one of 
Peirce’s three categories of being and that there are three further classifications of signs (icons, 
indications, and symbols) that also relate to the categories. Finally, I returned to Peirce’s 
Cognition Series to show how his denial of the faculties of intuition and introspection allow him 
to propose the Doctrine of the Thought-Sign which places the process of cognition within a 
continuum of signs stretching infinitely in each direction. 
 In its early formulation, the doctrine of the thought-sign leads to an unlimited semiosis. 
Since the process of signification stretches infinitely in each direction, it never stops, but keeps 
on going and going. From the moment we think in signs, there are only signs—all the way down, 
all the way up, and all the way out in each direction. In “What is a Sign?” Peirce claims that “it 
is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow. Omne symbolum de symbolo" [every 
symbol follows from a symbol] (EP 2.10). Since, as Hoopes expounds, meaning is found in the 
interpretant; and since, as Short notes, each interpretant leads to another, there does not appear to 
be anyway to obtain meaning within a sequence of thought-signs. This is precisely because any 
given interpretant at time t has the potential of becoming more developed by a further 
interpretant at a time sufficiently in the future. Furthermore, any given interpretant at time t 
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cannot be said to contain complete access to the thing-in-itself, either. Thus, there does not seem 
to be anyway to arrive at a final interpretant of what the sign is a sign of. We are caught up in the 
continuum of signs from before the beginning—placed in a vast labyrinth of signs from which 
there is no way out.  
 This brief account of the problem of semiosis and the crisis of meaning is intensified by 
Derrida’s reading of Peirce in Of Grammatology. I have only sketched the contours of the 
problem here, so that it can be brought into focus more clearly, with textual support from 
Derrida, in the following chapter. To foreshadow where I am ultimately headed, Short, Umberto 
Eco, and Vincent Colapietro note that the problem of unlimited semiosis confronting Peirce’s 
doctrine of the thought-sign has been grossly misinterpreted by Derrida (Short 42; Eco 
“Unlimited Semiosis” 205-07; Colapietro “Ground of Semiosis” 129-31). Peirce was aware of 
the problem of semiosis and made great attempts later in his life to overcome it. The shift from 
Peirce’s early semiotic account, to his mature account, hinges on addressing this problem of 
semiosis. For, contrary to Derrida’s reading, Peirce did not believe that the claim that all thought 
is in signs rises at the expense of meaning and truth. On the contrary, Peirce provides all the tools 
necessary to arrive at conception of reality, in Thirdness, and bursting with meaning. Until then, 











Derrida and the Dawn of Deconstruction 
Imaginations as candescent as …Derrida’s do not blaze very often. We should not let the 
constant brouhaha around Derrida—created, for the most part, by people who have not read his 
books—either rush us into premature judgements or hinder us from being glad to be his 
contemporaries.  
—Richard Rorty, “Derrida and the Philosophical Tradition” (1998, 328) 
 
 
 Jacques Derrida is an enigma. It is difficult to know where to begin with Derrida because 
so much has been written about him already. On the one hand, some have praised Derrida for his 
playful, but rigorous, criticisms of, what he calls, the “logocentric metaphysics of presence”—
which he traces from Plato through to Descartes, Kant, Frege, Husserl and so on into the 20th 
century (Derrida OG 49). Rudolphe Gasché elucidates how Derrida works from The Tain of the 
Mirror. The Tain referring to “the tinfoil, the silver lining, the lustreless back of the mirror” 
(Gasché 6). Gasché is taking Derrida seriously, and placing him in high honour, when he writes: 
 Derrida’s philosophy, rather than being a philosophy of reflection, is engaged in the  
 systematic exploration of that dull surface without which no reflection and no specular  
 and speculative activity would be possible, but which at the same time has no place and  
 no part in reflection’s scintillating play. (Gasché 6) 
Derrida’s deconstructions function to overturn metaphysics by exposing the very “dull surface” 
that makes philosophical reflection possible—exposing the limit of possibility which is never 
present within the “scintillating play.”  
On the other hand, Derrida’s work has been met with resistance, ranging from skepticism 
to disdain, by many important philosophers. In an interview with Reason, John Searle recalls a 
humorous encounter with Foucault:   
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 I once said this to Michel Foucault, who was more hostile to Derrida even than I am, and  
 Foucault said that Derrida practiced the method of obscurantisme terroriste (terrorism of  
 obscurantism). We were speaking French. And I said, “What the hell do you mean by  
 that?" And he said, "He writes so obscurely you can’t tell what he’s saying, that’s the  
 obscurantism part, and then when you criticize him, he can always say, 'You didn’t  
 understand me; you’re an idiot.' That’s the terrorism part.”11 
Derrida is thus a controversial philosopher who receives just as a much criticism as he does 
praise. But, does Derrida practice obscurantisme terroriste? Or have Searle and Foucault failed 
to see through to the “dull side” of the mirror? In what follows, I will take Derrida as seriously as 
I can, and try to uncover what he is up to when he refers to Peirce in Of Grammatology.  
 The main aim of this chapter is to provide the necessary background of Derrida’s Of 
Grammatology so that his reading of Peirce can be properly explicated. Now, Derrida only ever 
mentions Peirce for a few pages in all of Of Grammatology and his reading of Peirce is cast to 
the wayside almost as soon as it is broached. Derrida shifts from a critique of Saussure, through 
to Peirce, and then back to Saussure—leaving Peirce at the margins of the movement12 of his 
deconstruction. However, Derrida praises Peirce and his reading of Peirce marks a crucial step 
along the way to his “de-construction13 of the transcendental signified” (Derrida 49).  
 
11 Quoted from:  
 Postrel, Steven, and Edward Feser. “Reality Principles: An Interview with John R. Searle.”  
 Reason.com, Reason, 1 Feb. 2000. Web.  
12 I use “movement” because, as we will see, signs are always on the move and deconstruction is a 
process or movement through signs.  
13 Derrida writes “de-construction” rather than “deconstruction” because the transcendental signified is 
constructed at the very moment its deconstruction begins to unfold. And so, the hyphen is meant to 
signify the simultaneous construction or desire to have a signified and the very same instance that that 
signified is put beyond the play of signifiers. This will all make some more sense as our discussion 
develops.  
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Furthermore, it is Derrida himself who believes that in order to understand what is at 
stake in a particular text of philosophy, we must look to the margins of the philosophical text—to 
see where the author has limited their scope and find ways to show how the margins of the text 
undermine the text’s central governing structure. If we take Derrida seriously then (and I do), we 
should not so hastily gloss over his reading of Peirce, but rather, conduct a thorough excavation 
of his use of Peirce at the margins of Of Grammatology. Such an excavation might show where 
Derrida himself has gone astray, in his eventual turning back to Saussure moments later. For, 
Derrida once wrote that “every particular borrowing brings along with it the whole of 
metaphysics” (Derrida Writing and Difference, 281). It seems then, that at the very moment 
Derrida evokes Peirce, he opens himself up to Peirce’s entire philosophy—leaves a “trace” back 
to Peirce that has, at least, the potential to turn itself back on the very reading of Peirce that 
Derrida deploys. In what follows then, I track Derrida’s deconstruction of the Saussurean sign up 
until the point where he summons Peirce, I analyze Derrida’s reading of Peirce, pinpoint the 
“trace” back into Peirce’s work, and then follow that trace, in the final chapter, toward Peirce’s 
mature semiotic, which seems, to question Derrida’s use of Peirce’s early semiotic formulation.  
Before pinpointing the specific aspects of Derrida that pertain to the question of semiosis in 
Peirce, however, it would be helpful to both briefly iterate some of the main ways that Derrida 
has been deployed by his followers in the recent years and give an account of the greater project 
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Four Different Derrida(s) 
  
There are at least four different Derrida(s). The first is the Derrida taken up by scholars in 
literature and rhetoric departments around the globe. This Derrida is praised for developing the 
method of “deconstruction”—a particular way of reading literary texts that seeks to reveal what 
is really going on, between the lines, and deep within the structures of the text. In “Remarks on 
Deconstruction and Pragmatism,” Richard Rorty claims that he “has never been able to figure 
out what this method is, nor what was being taught…” to students in literature departments as 
the method of deconstruction (Rorty, “Remarks” 15). He states that he thinks of Derrida’s so-
called deconstruction only as the sort of thing that Derrida does (Rorty, “Remarks” 16). 
Derrida’s ‘method’ of deconstruction (applied to literary texts) is not of concern here. For the 
present purposes, we should heed Rorty’s advice, quit thinking of Derrida as a literary critic, and 
begin to take him more seriously as a philosopher—not as a philosopher of language either, but 
as a philosopher who “has a great deal to tell us about philosophy” (Rorty “Philosophy as a Kind 
of Writing” 308).  
 The second Derrida is placed, not in the literary tradition, but in the realm of philosophy. 
This is the Derrida that was taken seriously by thinkers in the American analytic tradition. Most 
notably is Samuel Wheeler. In Deconstruction as Analytic Philosophy, Wheeler presents a series 
of essays that attempts to get Derrida on the same wavelength as Quine, Davidson, and 
Wittgenstein—to cast Derrida as a kind of French Wittgenstein. Here, and contrary to Rorty’s 
aforementioned claim, Wheeler makes Derrida out to be a philosopher of language—one who 
shares, with Quine and Davidson, worries about a “magic language” consisting of self-
interpreting marks (Wheeler 15; 61-2). Wheeler hopes to show those philosophers—who tend to 
   
 
42 
disdain Derrida—that, in fact, Derrida shares many affinities with their projects in the 
philosophy of language. Only, Derrida approached the problems from the perspective of a 
vocabulary stemming from Hegel, while his counterparts in America often inherit the vocabulary 
of Kant and Frege. The point is, however, that those in analytic philosophy should not dismiss 
Derrida wholesale, but consider the many fruitful connections his work shares with some of the 
leading philosophers in their tradition. Wheeler attempts to build a bridge from the Continent to 
America—bridge the gap between so-called continental and so-called analytic philosophy. This 
second Derrida—call him Wheeler’s Derrida—is not of primary concern, either. In the present 
inquiry, I follow Wheeler only insofar as I am attempting to bridge the gap between Peircean 
pragmatism and Derrida’s deconstruction.  
 Thirdly, there is Rorty’s Derrida. Rorty’s Derrida is not strictly a philosopher of language 
(though he ascribes to and is sympathetic with Wheeler’s project). For Rorty, Derrida is best 
thought of as an ironist stemming from the Hegel-Nietzsche-Heidegger trajectory of thought. 
Rorty writes:  
 To understand Derrida, one must see his work as the latest development in this non- 
 Kantian [and so Hegelian], dialectical tradition—the latest attempt of the dialecticians to  
 shatter the Kantians’ ingenious image of themselves as accurately representing how  
 things really are. (Rorty “Philosophy as a Kind of Writing” 307) 
For Rorty’s Derrida, philosophy is nothing more than a kind of writing. Contrary to those who 
follow from Kant, for Rorty’s Derrida, there is just no way to move beyond writing to accurately 
represent the things in themselves—the whole division between noumena and phenomena 
evaporates into a system of writing. “Il n’y a pas de hors-texte,” Derrida writes in Of 
Grammatology (Derrida OG 158). There is nothing outside of the text—there is no outside-the-
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text. From the very beginning, we are placed within the text. And just as there is no final 
accumulation of history (but history just keeps on unfolding), so too is there no final written text 
that would hold all the truths of philosophy in place at once. As Rorty notes, for Derrida, “no one 
can make sense of the notion of a last commentary, a last discussion note, a good piece of writing 
which is more than the occasion for a better piece” (Rorty “Philosophy as a Kind of Writing” 
328). But this conclusion should not to be met with disdain.  
We need to give up the Kantian hope that philosophy can be something more than a kind 
of writing. Rather, we need to follow Derrida who adamantly claims: “On the contrary we must 
affirm it—in the sense that Nietzsche brings affirmation into play—with a certain laughter14 and 
with a certain dance” (Derrida “Speech and Phenomenon” 159). By affirming the notion of 
philosophy as a kind of writing, rather than disdaining it, we approach the text of philosophy 
with joy. We find, in the absence of the thing-in-itself (in the claim that philosophy is nothing 
more than writing), a kind of “limitlessness of play” (Derrida OG 50). In other words, by saying 
that there is no way to pierce through writing to get to the noumena, there is only writing and 
more writing. The joy is found in that fact that more writing and more writing still will result in 
better, new and interesting ways of understanding the history of philosophy—the play of 
philosophical ideas through history and into the future.  
 
14 To get a sense of the kind of laughter Derrida has in mind, one might recall the passage in Nietzsche 
where Zarathustra comes across a shepherd “writhing, gagging, in spasms, his face distorted”—a “heavy 
black snake” having slithered into his throat while he was asleep. Zarathustra, tugging on the snake in 
vain, urges the man to bite down with all his might—to chew the head off the snake and spit it out. The 
shepherd bites “with a good bite” and spews the snake out of him. The shepherd jumps up and begins to 
laugh. Zarathustra remarks: “Never yet on earth has a human being laughed as he laughed! O my 
brothers, I heard a laughter that was no human laughter; and now a thirst gnaws at me, a longing that 
never grows still.” (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “The Vision and the Riddle,” qtd. in The Portable 
Nietzsche 271-72).  
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Now, since Rorty is ultimately concerned with social hope and the public usefulness of 
philosophical views, he is at pains to stake out the usefulness of Derrida’s insistence that 
philosophy is just writing. On the one hand, the claim that philosophy is just writing is in accord 
with Rorty’s neopragmatist tracts: if philosophy is just writing, then the meat of it hinges on the 
way in which philosophical texts operate within historical epochs. Philosophical writing is 
deployed for one purpose or another within a particular culture at a particular juncture in history. 
On the other hand, while Rorty agrees with Derrida on the point that philosophy is just writing, 
he does not think that Derrida’s later “deconstructions” of particular philosophical texts are 
useful to society at the public level. Rather, Rorty thinks that Derrida’s many unique 
deconstructions should be relegated to the private sphere—they do not add to social progress but 
make up the musings of a poetic philosopher in private. Hence, Rorty’s view of Derrida as a 
private ironist (Rorty Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 125; “Remarks on Pragmatism and 
Deconstruction” 16). In this way, when Derrida writes of circumcision or of masturbation in 
Rousseau, he is not offering up a philosophical view pertinent to the public domain but is rather 
embracing the play of philosophy qua writing in the private domain. By framing Derrida as a 
private ironist, Rorty is able to forgive him for approaching the texts of philosophy on his own 
terms. Derrida does not care whether he is providing the “correct” reading of a philosophical text 
(because, for Derrida, there is no final reading of a text) nor whether he is giving adequate 
argumentation (in the traditional logical sense) to support his readings, but rather prefers to play 
with his favourite philosophical heroes in ways that please his idiosyncratic fancy.  
 When I say that Derrida does not care to give arguments to support his readings, I do not 
mean this as an insult or defamation. Although, some, like Thomas Short, have negatively 
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responded to Derrida’s lack of deploying adequate argumentation (Short 45). Derrida very 
clearly writes that 
  There is argumentation and argumentation… and I think that the accusations that are  
 often made against deconstruction derive from the fact that its raising the stakes of  
 argumentation is not taken into account. The fact that it is always a question of   
 reconsidering the protocols and the contexts of argumentation, the questions of   
 competence, the language of discussion, etc. (Derrida “Remarks on Deconstruction and  
 Pragmatism” 78) 
Derrida’s point is that deconstructive readings lift philosophy out of the realm of traditional 
logical argumentation. Rather than considering the propositional form of a philosophical text (to 
determine its validity or soundness or to poke holes in its premises), a deconstructive reading 
always takes a step back and considers the particular context in which the argument is being 
deployed. By “raising the stakes” in this way, Derrida attempts to show that we cannot distill a 
philosophical argument into its logical components because to do so would be to limit the 
possible ways in which we can read or interpret the text—it would be to constrain the play of the 
text by fixating it within a logical center that governs and restricts the wide array of possible 
interpretive moves available to the ‘reader’.  
Derrida calls this raising the stakes “pragrammatology” and uses the word to try to 
outline at least one similarity between his own deconstruction and Rorty’s neopragmatism. So, 
when Rorty uses Derrida to outline his view that the meaning of philosophical writing depends 
on the way that it is deployed within a given epoch, we can understand Rorty (and Derrida too) 
not as doing away with argumentation, but as raising the stakes of argumentation to consider the 
pragmatic contexts in which the arguments are deployed. We can think of this move as a kind of 
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looking-to-the-margins that inform argumentation; or as a kind of letting-the-margins inform 
argumentation.  
 It is worth noting, however, that while Derrida and Rorty are on the same page regarding 
argumentation, Derrida does not agree with Rorty’s reading of him as a private ironist. Derrida 
claims that he “obviously cannot accept the public/private distinction in the way he [Rorty] uses 
it in relation to my work” (Derrida “Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism” 78). Derrida 
writes that, rather than think of his writing as choosing the private over the public, one would do 
better to think of his later work as “performative problematizations of the public/private 
distinction” (Derrida “Remarks” 79). In this way, by problematizing the very distinction that 
Rorty deploys, Derrida is showing the public usefulness of his later texts. I will refrain from 
showing exactly how Derrida does problematize the public/private distinction. I merely wish to 
point out that Derrida himself does not agree entirely with Rorty’s reading of him as a private 
ironist. We should not, then, let Rorty’s Derrida as a private ironist inform our entire conception 
of Derrida.  
 Rather, we should think of Rorty’s Derrida much like we think of Wheeler’s Derrida: as 
trying to make a French Wittgenstein out of Derrida. In “Derrida and the Philosophical 
Tradition” Rorty writes that “People like me, who esteem Davidson and Wittgenstein equally 
and for the same reasons, typically read both men as nominalists, and thus as people who will 
have no truck with transcendental philosophy—with the discovery of conditions of 
possibility…” (Rorty “Derrida and the Philosophical Tradition” 331). By trying to get Derrida on 
the same wavelength as Wittgenstein and Davidson, Rorty ends up reading Derrida as a kind of 
nominalist who is equally displeased with the talk of transcendental philosophy. Rorty wants to 
read Derrida, like he reads Davidson and Wittgenstein, as showing that only the third dogma of 
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empiricism15 gives one reason to divide philosophy into two separate realms: an empirical realm 
[content] that pursues the causal conditions of actuality and a transcendental realm [scheme] that 
pursues conditions of possibility (Rorty 331). Borrowing from Geoffrey Bennington (who we 
will hear from shortly), Rorty wants to say (quoting Bennington) that nominalists like Derrida, 
Davidson, and Wittgenstein show that  
 any philosophy which gives itself world [content] and language [scheme] as two separate  
 realms separated by an abyss that has to be crossed remains caught, at the very point of  
 the supposed crossing, in the circle of dogmatism and relativism that is unable to   
 break. (Bennington 103; Rorty “Derrida and…” 331) 
As we have seen earlier, Rorty’s Derrida claims that philosophy, once thought of as a kind of 
writing, distills the divide between noumena and phenomena in Kant. This move functions here 
to simultaneously distill the divide between language and world in Bennington and scheme and 
content in Davidson. Rorty seems to have good reason to want to place Derrida alongside 
Davidson and Wittgenstein—to say, that once this gap has been collapsed, Derrida has freed 
himself from the chains of transcendental philosophy. However, Rorty admits that “for all the 
jokey and raunchy desublimizing that goes on in Derrida’s books, it is not clear that such escape, 
escape from a dusty fly-bottle, is what he wants” (Rorty “Derrida and…” 332). 
 This move, by Wheeler and Rorty, to turn Derrida into a Wittgensteinian nominalist who 
wishes to leave the traditional problems of philosophy behind—step outside of the transcendental 
domain of philosophy (outside of Wittgenstein’s “fly-bottle”) and into writing—has been met 
with resistance by the fourth Derrida.  
 
15 The third dogma of empiricism was popularized by Davidson in his essay “On The Very Idea of a 
Conceptual Scheme” in which he extends Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (reductionism and the 
analytic-synthetic distinction) to tend to the distinction between language (scheme) and world (content). 
Davidson wants to say that we cannot draw such a distinction between scheme and content.  
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The fourth Derrida is perhaps the closest to Derrida’s Derrida (though, as we will soon 
see, there is no Derrida’s Derrida because, for Derrida, there is no pure conception of the self or 
transcendental signified). The fourth Derrida is the Derrida of Geoffrey Bennington. Bennington 
wants to maintain a quasi-transcendental tone in Derrida’s work. He holds that, contrary to 
Rorty’s reading, Derrida does not do away with transcendental philosophy wholesale, but 
remains in a quasi-transcendental mode of philosophical thinking. Derrida, as quasi-
transcendentalist, would say that it is not a matter of choosing the empirical over the 
transcendental, but of letting the empirical play the role that the transcendental once played 
(Rorty “Derrida and….” 333).  In this way, Bennington claims that, for Derrida, there is no way 
to sever one’s self completely from the metaphysical logos—every philosophical position that 
claims to be empirical is always going to be bogged down by a kind of transcendental 
contraband (Bennington 309). This is precisely because the empirical, typically furnished in 
finitude, is what gives rise to the condition of possibility of transcendence16.  
 Bennington marks this transcendental contraband in the following difficult, but 
important, passage:  
 If one says that finitude is in some sense the condition of transcendence, one makes  
 it into the condition of possibility of transcendence, and one thus puts it into a   
 transcendental position with respect to transcendence. But the ultra-transcendental thus  
 produced puts into question the very structure of transcendence, which it pulls back down 
 onto a feature that transcendence would like to consider as empirical… This   
 deconstruction moves toward a comprehension of any discourse ruled by the empirical/ 
 transcendental opposition and everything that goes along with it: but this movement,  
 which would traditionally be represented as a movement upward… is in fact, or at the  
 
16 By “transcendence” I think Bennington is playing with two senses of the word: in the first sense, the 
transcendent is beyond the finite or actual—it is that which exists beyond the play of signs. In the second 
sense, transcendence is meant to signify the Kantian project of transcendental idealism—the doctrine that  
the conditions of possibility of all experience are space and time and the categories.  
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 same time,  a movement “downward,” for it is the empirical and contingent, themselves  
 necessarily displaced… which are found higher than the high, higher than height, in  
 height’s falling. L’érection tombe. (Bennington 279) 
The main thrust of this passage hinges on the first claim that “If one says that finitude is in some 
sense the condition of transcendence, one makes it into the condition of possibility of 
transcendence, and one thus puts it into a transcendental position with respect to transcendence.” 
If, from a finite experience, we can ascertain, a-priori, the condition of transcendence—space 
and time as the form in which this finite experience must take place—then, in that instance, we 
make the finite into the condition of possibility of transcendence. That is to say, the finite 
experience is what makes the project of transcendental idealism possible. But in this move, one 
ends up putting the finite into “a transcendental position with respect to transcendence”—makes 
the finite out to be transcendental. And so, the finite and empirical is always bogged down by 
this transcendental contraband—by the inability to separate the finite from the transcendental. 
At the very moment that the finite/empirical is chosen over the transcendental (as is the 
case with Rorty’s nominalistic Derrida), the empirical or finite position that Rorty is left with 
ends up making possible the very transcendental project that he is attempting to displace. The 
very distinction between the empirical and the transcendental becomes, for Bennington’s 
Derrida, both “inescapable and forever unusable” (Rorty “Derrida and… 333). As Bennington 
continues: ““Quasi-Transcendental” names what results from this displacement, by maintaining 
as legible the trace of a passage through the traditional opposition, and by giving this opposition 
a radical uncertainty” (Bennington 279). Bennington rephrases this “radical uncertainty” as a 
kind of “undecidability” thus signaling the inability to choose between either a purely empirical 
approach or a purely transcendental approach. Derrida is thus neither a purely transcendental 
philosopher, nor a philosopher whose claim that there is nothing outside the text provides good 
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reason to stop asking transcendental questions. Rather, he is caught in the space between these 
two opposing traditions: unable to come down firmly on either side of the divide, but willing to 
entertain the notion of a trace through the divide.  
 If we consider the quasi-transcendental notes in Derrida’s writing, we see that Rorty’s 
Derrida as French Wittgenstein is called into question. The nominalistic bent that Derrida’s 
writing sometimes resembles does not, as Bennington warns, signal the end of philosophy (the 
end of asking transcendental questions). Furthermore, it does not mean, as Rorty’s depiction of 
Derrida as a private ironist seems to suggest, that there is “no possible occupation left other than 
that of rifling through the dustbins of philosophy to get out of them the meager nourishment that 
the tradition had not managed to swallow” (Bennington 285). It does, however, suggest that there 
is no way for one to wiggle one’s self out of this stranglehold “by sharpening the distinction 
between phenomena and things in themselves” (Bennington 286). This is because the distinction 
between phenomena and noumena is already cast into doubt by Derrida’s claim that there is no 
way to get outside of the text (Bennington 286). Derrida, as a quasi-transcendentalist, is caught 
in “the milieu of differentiation”—in the differ-a-nce between the finite and transcendental 
(286). As Rorty describes: quasi-transcendentality is what you get “if you respect philosophy 
enough to realize that it is inescapable, but not enough to take the idea of conditions of 
possibility as seriously as Kant did” (Rorty “Derrida and…” 332). Bennington’s Derrida seems 
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Speech and Writing in Of Grammatology 
  
So far, I have been trying to locate Derrida in the philosophical terrain. I have considered 
four different ways that Derrida’s work has been deployed by his followers—some of whom 
wish to read Derrida as driving the final nail in the coffin of transcendental metaphysics, while 
others wish to maintain that Derrida cannot do away with the metaphysical logos completely. 
Now, I turn to give a brief account of the project that Derrida is up to in Of Grammatology. By 
outlining his critique of the tendency to favour speech over writing, I move toward the moment 
where Derrida evokes Peirce’s theory of signs. Once the general project of Of Grammatology has 
been outlined, I will be in a position to give an account of Derrida’s reading of Peirce. 
Afterwards, I will consider some of the ways that scholars of Peirce have responded to Derrida’s 
reading. This will set the stage for the final chapter in which I will return to Peirce to show how 
he solves the problem of semiosis without doing away with meaning altogether.  
 In Of Grammatology, Derrida turns his deconstructive eye toward the common trend to 
privilege speech over writing throughout the course of philosophical history. Particularly, 
Derrida’s target is Saussure, although, to deconstruct Saussure, he needs to pass through Plato. 
His ultimate aim is to show that Saussure’s choice, in his Course in General Linguistics, to 
favour the phonetic (spoken, interior, essential) system of signs over the graphic (written, 
exterior, inessential) system of signs has always already been intruded by writing. That is, by 
building his general semiology from phonetic foundations, Saussure limits the import of the 
written system of signs—restricts the play of writing to the margins by fixating on the presence 
of the spoken word. So, when Saussure says that sound is “the only true bond” which 
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“constitutes the unity of language throughout time” (Saussure 25), Derrida likens Saussure’s 
move to a kind of Platonism born out of the Phaedrus.  
In the Phaedrus, Socrates warns of the intrusion of writing. Derrida writes that, for both 
Plato and Saussure, writing is exterior to speech: “writing would have the exteriority that one 
attributes to utensils; to what is even an imperfect tool and a dangerous, almost maleficent 
technique” (Derrida OG 34). Recall, Socrates claims that writing results in forgetfulness. That 
the truth can only be obtained through the dialogical method—through dialogue—through 
speaking with one another and challenging one another’s ideas. Writing can be misinterpreted, 
whereas, in speech, one can ease the listener out of misinterpreting the message being conveyed 
through a back and forth exchange. It is only through dialogue that we catch a glimpse of the 
forms and of our souls.  
Derrida thus claims that “the Phaedrus denounced writing as the intrusion of an artful 
technique, a forced entry of a totally original sort, an archetypal violence: eruption of the outside 
within the inside…” (Derrida OG 34).17 In other words, writing—blemished and imperfect—
intrudes speech (which is interior). That is, writing—a violent force from the outside (from the 
exterior)—penetrates and threatens the inside of Saussure’s phonetic system.  
 Indeed, Saussure follows this Platonic denouement of writing. Derrida claims that:  
 For Saussure it [writing] is even a garment of perversion and debauchery, a dress of  
 corruption and disguise, a festival mask that must be exorcised, that is to say warded off,  
 by the good word. (Derrida OG 35) 
 
17 Derrida seems to have his finger on the pulse of the whole divide between logic and rhetoric here. The 
“artfulness” of writing can be thought of as rhetoric which intrudes on and has been traditionally opposed 
to pure and genuine philosophical inquiry. Writing is a sophist technique. Speech is reserved for truth and 
philosophy.  
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And so, “writing is not a garment but a disguise,” Saussure says (Saussure 29). The system of 
graphic written signs gets in the way of the pure system of phonetic spoken signs—the phonetic 
signifier is closer in proximity to thought itself, while the graphic signifier is farther removed 
from thought. Writing should thus be forced to the exterior—left outside of a general semiology.  
For Derrida though, Saussure’s best efforts to contain semiology within the confines of 
the phonetic signifier has already been undercut at the very moment Socrates marked the 
intrusion of writing: 
 By a slow movement whose necessity is hardly perceptible, everything that for at least  
 some twenty centuries tended toward and finally succeeded in being gathered under the  
 name of language is beginning to let itself be transferred to, or at least    
 summarized under, the name of writing. (Derrida OG, 6)  
His deconstruction of the relationship between speech and writing amounts to a complete 
debunking of the traditional opposition: once the deconstruction is underway, writing overtakes, 
or “usurps” (as in dethroning a king who once ruled), the power that speech is thought to have 
over language and writing (Derrida OG 37). In this way, Derrida writes that the ““Usurpation” 
has always already begun” (Derrida OG 37). The usurpation of the spoken word by a system of 
writing has been slowly gaining traction from the beginning of language and meaning. The 
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Difference, Differance: What’s the Difference? 
  
One of the best ways to understand Derrida’s deconstruction of Saussure’s phonetic 
system of signs is by considering his ‘concept’ (I put ‘concept’ in scare quotes because it is not a 
concept so much as it is an “assemblage” of meanings) differance in his famous lecture 
“Differance” (Derrida “Differance” 129). Derrida begins this essay/lecture18 with the following 
passage: 
 The verb “to differ” seems to differ from itself. On the one hand, it indicates difference as 
 distinction, inequality, or discernibility; on the other, it expresses the interposition of  
 delay, the interval of a spacing and temporalizing19 that puts off until “later” what is  
 presently denied, the possible that is presently impossible. (Derrida “Differance” 129) 
For Derrida, differance20 is an “assemblage” precisely because the word contains both of these 
meanings. In the one sense, difference (with an e) marks a distinction between two things. This 
is, of course, the meaning traditionally assigned to difference. It stems from the Greek word 
diapherein. In the second sense, Differance (with an a) marks a kind of deferral: a putting of 
until later. This second sense is not captured in the Greek diapherein, but instead, finds its 
etymological root in the Latin word differre. Derrida’s differance (with an a) is meant to capture 
 
18 It is important to note that this essay was delivered as a lecture at the meeting of the Société at the 
Sorbonne on January 27, 1968 (one year after Of Grammatology was published). It is important because, 
being a lecture, Derrida actually spoke the words herein. And the very fact that the context in which this 
piece was delivered meant that it was spoken, actually informs the point that Derrida is trying to make. If 
we consider the quote from earlier about how Derrida wishes to look to the context in which arguments 
are posed to get a full grasp of the position being articulated, we will see this lecture as a telling example 
of the kind of raising the stakes of argumentation that Derrida has in mind.  
19 Differance gives us the conditions of possibility: of space and time (spacing and temporalizing) as in 
Kant.  
20 Derrida never writes differance with a capital “D” because to do so would be to make the assemblage 
out to be a master-word, which governs the play of signs, like Heidegger’s choice to capitalize Being.   
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and assemble both of these meanings together at the same time. Differance is to both differ and 
defer. Now, I will delve deeper into the upshots of Derrida’s “assemblage” when I consider 
David Pettigrew’s comparison of Peirce and Derrida later on. At the present, however, I want to 
pause here and consider how Derrida’s “differance” helps to show that writing has always 
already intruded upon the spoken word.  
 Recall, first, that Derrida is delivering this piece as a lecture and so is conveying his 
message by speaking rather than by writing—we must raise the stakes of argumentation to grasp 
this point. Recall, second, that Derrida is speaking in the French language when he gives this 
lecture. Now, in French, there is no audible/phonetic (or heard) difference (with an e in the sense 
to mark a distinction) between the two meanings: difference and differance. It is impossible to 
know whether Derrida intends to mean differance (with an a) or difference (with an e) when he 
is speaking the word “differance” in French because, in both instances, the word rolls off the 
tongue in the exact same way. The difference between the two meanings cannot be marked 
phonetically, but only graphically, by a written signifier. Derrida says: 
 Now, in point of fact, it happens that this graphic difference (the a instead of the e), this  
 marked difference between two apparently vocalic notations, between vowels, remains  
 purely graphic: it is written or read but it is not heard… it remains, silent, secret and  
 discreet, like a tomb… It is a tomb which cannot even be made to resonate. For I cannot  
 even let you know, by my talk, now being spoken before the Société Française de   
 Philosophie, which difference I am talking about at the very moment I speak of it.  
 (Derrida “Differance” 132) 
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There is thus a limit to phonetic signification which is exposed by the “assemblage” of 
differance. The phonetic signifier fails to mark the difference between the two senses of 
differance, whereas a graphic signifier can.  
Derrida continues: 
 I can only talk about this graphic difference by keeping to a very indirect speech about  
 writing, and on the condition that I specify each time I am referring to difference with an  
 e or differance with an a… In any event, when I do specify which difference I mean— 
 when I say “with an e” or “with an a”—this will refer irreducibly to a written text, a text  
 governing my talk, a text that I keep in front of me, that I will read, and toward which I  
 shall have to try to lead your hands and eyes. (Derrida “Differance” 132) 
Derrida’s remark here relates back to our discussion of Of Grammatology. Derrida extends the 
limitations of the phonetic signifier by referring to a written text which serves to govern his 
speech about differance. Each time he says “with an a” or “with an e” he exposes the very 
difference that the phonetic signifier attempts to conceal. He, in each instance, lets the graphic 
difference be heard by paradoxically reducing the phonetic signifier within a graphic system of 
signs. Whereas, for Saussure, the graphic signifier is merely a representation of the spoken word, 
for Derrida in the case of differance, the phonetic signifier is only an imperfect representation of 
the purely graphic signifier—it is an imperfect representation because it fails to mark the 
difference between the two senses of differance. The roles are thus reversed in Derrida. Speech 
disguises writing, not the other way around. 
 The text governing Derrida’s talk usurps and displaces the phonetic signifier—drains it of 
its power over the system of signs. While Rousseau once said (and this is in accord with Plato 
and Saussure too) that “writing is nothing but the representation of speech” (Rousseau 
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“Fragment inédit d’un essai sur les langues” qtd. In Derrida OG 27) and so is a sign of a sign; 
Derrida wants to argue that “writing is not a sign of a sign, except if one says it of all signs, 
which would be more profoundly true” (Derrida OG 43). Derrida thus concludes his 
deconstruction of the phonetic sign in Of Grammatology by claiming that 
What Saussure saw without seeing, knew without being able to take into account… is 
that a certain model of writing was necessarily but provisionally imposed (but for the 
inaccuracy in principle, insufficiency of fact, and the permanent usurpation) as 
instrument and technique of representation of a language. (Derrida OG 45) 
The imposition of writing on speech threatens the phonetic foundations (or origin) of Saussure’s 
general semiology.  
 More importantly, writing has threatened this origin from the very beginning—it has 
been permanently usurped from the start. We cannot appeal to the bond of sound to unify 
language through time. There is only writing; and it is only then that  
one realizes that what was chased off limits, the wandering outcast of linguistics 
[writing], has indeed never ceased to haunt language as its primary and most intimate 
possibility. Then something which was never spoken and which is nothing other than 
writing itself as the origin of language writes itself within Saussure’s discourse. (Derrida 
OG 45) 
Writing calls into question the conception of speech as the origin of language. Writing qua 
representation “mingles with what it represents [speech], to the point where one speaks as one 
writes, one thinks as if the represented were nothing more than the shadow or reflection of the 
representer” (Derrida OG 36). Writing stands in for speech as a representation stands in for its 
representer—as a sign of a sign—and so conceals and effaces what it represents: shows that “the 
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point of origin becomes ungraspable” (Derrida OG 36). We thus cannot maintain a radical 
distinction—as Saussure, Rousseau and Socrates tend to—between a purely spoken and a purely 
written system of signs. By a movement of deconstruction, the outside (writing) has become 
intimately interwoven with the inside (speech). With this radical distinction dissolved, Derrida 
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The Detour of the Sign 
  
For Derrida, it is only after the distinction between phonetic and graphic signifiers has 
been deconstructed that we can begin to deconstruct the Saussurean sign in its totality. Recall, 
from earlier, that the Saussurean signs consists, in its totality, as a combination of signifier and 
signified:  
 I propose to retain the word sign [signe] to designate the whole and to replace concept  
 and sound-image respectively by signified [signifie] and signifier [signifiant]; the last two 
 terms have the advantage of indicating the opposition that separates them from each other 
 and from the whole of which they are parts. (Saussure 67) 
The signifier plays the role of the sound-image or signal and the signified plays the role of the 
concept (the sense and referent (or object) are both encompassed by the term signified). The two 
unify to form the sign in its totality: one can think of a piece of paper as being the sign; the 
signifier and the signified occupying the space on each side of the piece of paper. They are 
inseparable in the sense that they make up each side of the paper. However, the unity between 
signifier and signified is arbitrary and so is synchronically21 marked by a structure of difference. 
 Indeed, Saussure’s thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign, seems, for Derrida, to challenge 
the very distinction between phoneme and grapheme before it is even posed as a distinction. To 
explain how the sign, in its totality, comes prior to the distinction, we need to consider, more 
thoroughly, the arbitrariness of the sign. For Saussure, the thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign 
suggests that there is no natural link between the signifier and the signified: “The bond between 
 
21 The diachronic axis marks the history of a words meaning throughout time, while the synchronic axis 
contains the meaning of the word in a single instance in time; but only by its difference from other words 
held in place at that same time. 
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the signifier and the signified is arbitrary” (Saussure 67). That is to say, the signified is not 
motivated by an actual object existing in the world, nor is the signified tied to its signifier by a 
natural link. The connection between a signifier and its signified is only marked by its difference 
from the other signs at play within the system or structure of language. Saussure writes: 
 Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has neither ideas nor sounds that  
 existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have  
 issued from the system. The idea or phonic substance that a sign contains is of less  
 importance than the other signs that surround it. (Saussure 118) 
The word, or signifier, ‘dog’ is not naturally tied to a four-legged fury creature (does not 
motivate the signified or concept dog), but only signifies the dog by its difference from other 
signs (like say, ‘cat’ or ‘donkey’). In this way, there can be no natural bond between a signifier 
and its signified, but only an arbitrary unity marked by difference. 
 Here, Saussure distinguishes his concept of the sign from the symbol.22 Saussure claims 
that a symbol  
 is never wholly arbitrary; it is not empty, for there is the rudiment of a natural bond  
 between the signifier and the signified. The symbol of justice, a pair of scales, could not  
 be replaced by just any other symbol, such as a chariot. (Saussure 68) 
There seems then, to be a natural bond between the pair of scales and the symbol of justice—this 
bond has become natural because it has gained traction in a linguistic community, diachronically, 
through time. Whereas the symbol is seemingly naturally unified, the sign is arbitrarily unified: 
 
22 This is not to be confused with Peirce’s use of the term “Symbol”. In fact, by symbol, Peirce means 
quite the opposite: that symbols, as we have seen, are conventional and determined by use, not natural. 
Derrida, as we will soon see, evokes Peirce precisely because his definition of “symbol” directly opposes 
Saussure’s use of the term.   
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“I mean that it is unmotivated [by nature], i.e. arbitrary in that it actually has no natural 
connection with the signified” (Saussure 69).  
Following, Derrida sets up a binary between natural motivated symbols and institutional 
unmotivated signs, between physis and nomos: 
 …from the moment that one considers the totality of determined signs, spoken, and a  
 fortiori written, as unmotivated institutions [as arbitrarily unified], one must exclude any  
 relationship of natural subordination, any natural hierarchy among signifiers or orders of  
 signifiers. (Derrida OG 44) 
For Derrida, the intrusion of writing (of grammatology (or the study of writing qua signs)) 
disturbs this binary between nature and institution—opens up the possibility of a total system of 
signs in general—a total system which must be thought before the division between grapheme 
and phoneme. “The very idea of institution—hence of the the arbitrariness of the sign—,” 
Derrida writes, “is unthinkable before the possibility of writing and outside its horizon” (Derrida 
OG 44). This is to say that we cannot make sense of Saussure’s thesis unless we have already 
contested the distinction between the phonetic and graphic system of signs. At the very moment 
that Saussure speaks of the arbitrariness of the sign, he calls into question his prior claim that the 
phonetic system of signs is, in some ways, more fundamental to the study of language than the 
graphic system of signs. He, in this instance, makes writing out to be a mere symbol of the 
spoken word: “We must then conclude that only the signs called natural, those that Hegel and 
Saussure call “symbols,” escape semiology as grammatology” (Derrida OG 45). It is precisely 
because Saussure makes writing out to be a symbol—and thus as a natural representation of the 
spoken word—that he is able to exclude writing from his general semiology which deals only 
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with signs. Symbols, which are natural and thus motivated, are for Saussure, opposed to signs 
which are arbitrary and unmotivated.  
But Derrida finds, in Saussure’s thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign, the means to turn 
Saussure’s opposition between sign and symbol—between speech and writing—in on itself:  
 The thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign thus indirectly but irrevocably contests   
 Saussure’s declared proposition when he chases writing to the outer darkness of   
 language. This thesis successfully accounts for a conventional [and so instituted]   
 relationship between the phoneme and the grapheme… but by the same token it forbids  
 that the latter be an “image” of the former… One must therefore challenge, in the very  
 name of the arbitrariness of the sign, the Saussurean definition of writing as “image”— 
 hence as natural symbol—of language.  
 (Derrida OG 45) 
By showing that the relationship between writing and speech—grapheme and phoneme—is 
conventional and instituted, Derrida challenges the Saussurean division between symbol and 
sign: makes the symbol out to be a sign “within a total system open, let us say, to all possible 
investments of sense” (Derrida OG 45). And for Derrida we must begin, not with a division 
between symbol and sign—speech and writing or physis and nomos—but with “the possibility of 
that total system” (45). The beginning has already begun before the separation of sign and 
symbol—the whole history of metaphysics springs from the possibility of this total system of 
signs composed of signifiers and signifieds. 
 Derrida’s move to consider the total system of signs brings along with it the concept of 
the trace. In her preface to Of Grammatology, Gayatri Spivak clarifies that, for Derrida, the word 
trace in French connotes “track,” “footprint,” and “imprint” (Spivak xv). The trace is a word 
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“that cannot be a master-word [in the sense that Heidegger makes Being out to be a master-
word], that presents itself as a mark of interior presence, origin, master” (Spivak xv). In the case 
of signs (composed of signifier and signified in the Saussurean sense), the trace marks a passage, 
or foot trail, back to a moment of originary differance between the signifier and the signified. I 
use differance (with an a) here, carefully, to suggest that the point of difference between signifier 
and signified, for Derrida, is not only different (as with an e) but also deferred (as with an a)—or 
put off indefinitely. That is to say, the signifier is forever different from the signified and that 
that difference is put off or deferred indefinitely.  
For Derrida, the great error of metaphysics is to seek a unity between signifier and 
signified which would declare that “a sign brings forth the presence of a signified” (Spivak xvi). 
The longing to seek the presence of the signified—to ascertain the truth of all signs by fixating 
on the presence of the signified—is the main thrust of the logocentric metaphysics of presence 
that Derrida is ultimately deconstructing. In Derrida, there can be no such unity between signifier 
and signified. The presence of the signified is put off, or deferred, by an endless succession of 
signifiers, or traces. We can imagine Derrida, then, as peeling Saussure’s piece of paper apart 
such that the signifier is separated from the signified. Spivak writes that: 
 Word and thing or thought never in fact become one. We are reminded of, referred to,  
 what the convention of words sets up as thing or thought, by a particular arrangement of  
 words. The structure of reference works and can go on working not because of the  
 identity between these so-called components parts of the sign, but because of their  
 relationship of difference. The sign marks a place of difference. (Spivak xvi) 
The Saussurean conception of the sign leaves a trace to this “place of difference.” 
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 Now for Derrida, both the phonetic and graphic system of signs are made possible by the 
same structure of différance in general. This allows Derrida to claim that “what opens the 
possibility of thought is not merely the question of being [as in Heidegger], but also the never-
annulled difference from the “completely other” [the completely other, here, playing the role of 
the signified]” (Spivak xvii). The completely other plays the role of the signified because the 
signified is other than the signifier—is always different from the signifier. Bennington clarifies 
this point when he writes that, for Derrida, differance marks the “differentiality or being-
different of those differences” (Bennington 71). The being-different (or differance) is what 
produces and maintains the differences between, say, time and space (in Kant), beings and Being 
(in Heidegger), and signifier and signified (in Saussure). Differance is what makes the difference 
possible—is the condition of possibility for all possible interpretation (and is thus thought before, 
or prior to, all of the differences mentioned above).   
 The differance which produces the difference between signifier and signified, then, is 
what keeps one from unifying the signifier and signified within the confines of the sign. And 
with this lack of unity, we ruin the notion of the Saussurean sign in its totality. In this way, 
Spivak claims that the “the structure of the sign is determined by the trace or track of that other 
[signified] which is forever absent” (Spivak xvii). The signifier leaves a trace to this signified, 
but the trace never leads one to the signified, only to another signifier. 
 Derrida must then borrow a technique from Heidegger and put the Saussurean sign under 
erasure (Sous rature):   
 the sign must be the unity of a heterogeneity, since the signified (sense or thing, noeme or 
 reality) is not in itself a signifier, a trace: in any case is not constituted in its sense by a  
 relationship with a possible trace… This is the inevitable response as soon  as one asks: 
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 “what is the sign?,” that is to say, when one submits the sign to the question of   
 essence, to the “ti esti.” The “formal essence” of the sign can only be determined in  
 terms of presence. One can not get around that response, except by challenging the very  
 form of the question and beginning to think that the sign is that ill-named thing, the only  
 one, that escapes the instituting question of philosophy: “What is…?” (Derrida OG 18-9) 
Put sous rature, the sign is that ill-named thing. The ‘is’ and the ‘thing’ in the sentence are 
crossed out because, as Derrida shows earlier in the passage, the sign is not actually the thing or 
signified: the presence of the signified is deferred, but the signifier still leaves a trace to this 
signified. In this way, the ‘is’ and ‘thing’ still play a role in the structure of signs, but by crossing 
them out, Derrida strips them of their presence. Derrida clarifies a few pages later that: 
 That deletion is the final writing of an epoch. Under its strokes the presence of a   
 transcendental signified is effaced while still remaining legible. Is effaced while still  
 remaining legible, is destroyed while making visible the very idea of the sign. In as much  
 as it de-limits onto-theology, the metaphysics of presence and logocentricism, this last  
 writing is also the first writing. (Derrida OG 23).  
By showing that the signified is never present within the play of signifiers, Derrida marks the 
closure of the metaphysics of presence—the desire to reach the signified in all its splendor. The 
signified becomes transcendent: is placed beyond the play of signifiers. In doing so, he destroys 
the unity of the Saussurean sign as signifying presence, while at the same time, laying the 
concept of the sign bare through differance. We see the sign split apart, not as a unity between 
signifier and signified, but as an indefinite stream of signifiers that constantly defer the presence 
of the signified. The mark of this closure, found only once the sign is put sous rature, is the end 
of the metaphysics of presence, but only the beginning of deconstruction.    
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 Before I turn to Peirce, I point out one more passage from Derrida, found in his lecture 
“Differance,” that helps to summarize the movement of the deconstruction of Saussure’s sign 
that I have been tracking in this section. Since, in this lecture, Derrida is speaking to a general 
audience, his description of the deconstruction of the Saussurean sign is especially clear. The 
passage nicely sums up the meat of Derrida’s critique of Saussure. Derrida writes: 
 Let us begin with the problem of signs and writing—since we are already in the midst of  
 it. We ordinarily say that a sign is put in place of the thing itself, the present thing  
 —“thing” holding here for the sense as well as the referent. Signs represent the present in 
 its absence; they take the place of the present. When we cannot take hold of or show the  
 thing, let us say the present, the being-present, when the present does not present itself,  
 then we signify, we go through the detour of signs.23 We take up or give signs; we make  
 signs. The sign would thus be a deferred presence. Whether it is a question of verbal or  
 written signs, monetary signs, electoral delegates, or political representatives, the   
 movement of signs defers the moment of encountering the thing itself, the moment at  
 which we could lay hold of it, consume or expend it, touch it, see it, have a present  
 intuition of it. (Derrida “Differance” 138) 
What Derrida is expressing here is profound: the signifier does not signify its signified, but 
rather, the absence of its signified. The sign thus signifies deferred presence. From the moment 
that we pose a system of signs, we have no choice but to pass through the detour of the sign.  
 Imagine, if you will, that you are driving to a destination. Let’s call the destination the 
signified. For Derrida, you never actually get to the destination you are seeking—you never 
reach the signified. At each turn or crossroads, when the destination seems a little bit closer, you 
 
23 My emphasis.  
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come across a sign for a detour. You have no choice but to veer in the direction of the sign. You 
follow the sign, hoping it will lead you to your destination. But you never get there. At the next 
turn, there is only another detour sign. And, at the turn after that, another. And still after that, 
another; and so on ad infinitum. You just keep on driving until you run out of gas or die. You 
never reach the signified but are forever enclosed in this series of detours—in the detour of the 
sign. Indeed, the sign is “only conceivable on the basis of the presence that it defers and in view 
of the deferred presence one intends to reappropriate (Derrida “Differance” 138). It is this very 
structure of differance that allows for the de-construction of the transcendental signified. And it 
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Derrida’s Reading of Peirce; or  
the de-construction of the transcendental signified 
  
Derrida turns to Peirce, in Of Grammatology, just after he has exposed the Saussurean 
tendency to favour speech over writing and in the midst of his deconstruction of the sign in its 
totality. Indeed, Peirce provides Derrida with the machinery to broach the deconstruction of this 
greatest totality (the sign). It is important to note at the outset, however, that when Derrida 
invokes Peirce, he does not do so to give an adequate interpretation of Peirce’s theory of signs—
this is not Derrida’s aim. Rather, Derrida deploys Peirce as a technology, a tool or utensil, that 
aids the movement of his deconstruction only insofar as it exposes the indefiniteness of reference 
from sign to sign. Derrida dispenses with Peirce shortly thereafter and returns to a Saussurean 
conception of the sign sous rature. We will see then, that while Derrida ultimately ends up 
turning away from Peirce, it is Peirce who provides him with the means to do away with the 
presence of the signified—it is Peirce who motivates the de-construction of the transcendental 
signified. I will thus begin by outlining just how Derrida uses Peirce as a means to de-construct 
the transcendental signified. In the final chapter, however, I will suggest that the Peircean 
technology that Derrida utilizes provides us with a trace back into Peirce’s theory of signs. The 
trace into Peirce that Derrida leaves behind is enough to expose the fundamental difference 
between Peirce and Derrida: that of continuity and play.  
 When analyzing Derrida’s reading of Peirce, scholars like Umberto Eco, David 
Pettigrew, and Jeffrey Barnouw begin with the famous passage in Of Grammatology where 
Derrida writes that: 
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 Peirce goes very far in the direction I have called the de-construction of the   
 transcendental signified, which, at one time or another, would place a reassuring end to  
 the reference24 from sign to sign.  (Derrida OG 49) 
However, Derrida actually evokes Peirce on the page prior, and so we should begin there and 
work our way slowly and carefully to the aforementioned passage. 
 Derrida first poses Peirce in direct opposition to Saussure: 
 In his project of semiotics, Pierce seems to have been more attentive than Saussure to the  
 irreducibility of this becoming-unmotivated [of the sign]. In his terminology one must  
 speak of the becoming-unmotivated of the symbol, the notion of the symbol playing here  
 a role analogous to that of the sign which Saussure opposes precisely to the symbol.  
 (Derrida OG 48) 
When Derrida says that Peirce is more attentive than Saussure to the irreducibility of this 
becoming-unmotivated he means that Peirce has recognized the inability to reduce the symbol to 
a simple origin of presence. Peirce has already recognized, and independently of Saussure, that 
the process of signification does not refer to a presence that the signified brings forth. Rather, for 
Peirce and Derrida, the presence of the thing itself is, as we have already seen, mediated through 
signs. Derrida then goes on to quote a passage from Peirce’s “What is a Sign?”. I have already 
discussed this passage in the context of Peirce’s work earlier. But I will revisit it again, here, in 
the context of Derrida. I thus quote Peirce through Derrida: 
 Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs, particularly  
 from icons, or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of icons and symbols. We think  
 
24 In the original French, “reference”, for Derrida, is renvoi. Barnouw suggests that a more adequate 
translation of renvoi would be referral. This would disambiguate Derrida’s use of “reference” here from 
the meanings attributed to “reference” in the traditional philosophy of language (Barnouw 78). 
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 only in signs. These mental signs are of mixed nature; the symbol parts of them are called 
 concepts. If a man makes a new symbol, it is by thoughts involving concepts. So it is only 
 out of symbols that a new symbol can grow. Omne symbolum de symbolo [every symbol  
 follows from a symbol]. (Peirce qtd. in Derrida OG 48) 
Derrida’s reading of Peirce focuses primarily on the Peircean symbol. He does not go into detail 
about icons or indices, but he does recognize that, in Peirce, symbols “come into being by 
development out of other signs.” In this way, it is Peirce’s claim that symbols can only grow out 
of other symbols that Derrida focuses on. From this claim, in Peirce, Derrida seems to suggest 
that the icons and mixed signs that make up symbols do not act as roots that “comprise the 
structural originality of the field of symbols” (Derrida OG 48). That is to say, the signs which 
make up symbols—underpin them—are not roots, or sturdy foundations, or a presence which 
contains the symbol. No, Derrida claims that since every symbol follows from a symbol there 
could be no foundation on which all these symbols could rest.  
 Unlike for Saussure, there is no way to reduce the referral from sign to sign—symbol to 
symbol—within the confines of a foundation or presence that persists outside of the growth of 
symbols. We are left in a web or nexus of symbols that stretch out indefinitely and irreducibly in 
each direction. The symbols continue to grow indefinitely and irreducibly because each symbol 
follows from another and there is no way to reduce this process by terminating it with a presence. 
There is, as Derrida warns, “no ground of nonsignification—understood as insignificance or an 
intuition of a present truth—[that] stretches out to give it foundation under the play and coming 
into being of signs” (Derrida OG 48). It is signs or symbols all the way down and all the way out 
in each direction, for Derrida. And it is Peirce who apparently leads him to this conclusion.  
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 In this way, Semiotics no longer depends on a logic that exists prior to the growth of 
symbols to provide its foundations. Rather, “Logic, according to Peirce, is only a semiotic” (48). 
Logic qua semiotics finds its heritage in the “project of the Grammatica speculativa of Thomas 
d’Erfurt, falsely attributed to Duns Scotus” (48). The grammatica speculativa sets out to 
elaborate “a formal doctrine of conditions which a discourse must satisfy in order to have a 
sense, in order to “mean”, even if it is false or contradictory” (48). This project of discerning the 
conditions which a discourse must satisfy in order for it mean or signify, however, is only one 
prong of a tripartite enterprise—there are three branches of semiotics for Peirce (grammatica 
speculativa is the first). Derrida goes on to claim that, for Peirce, once we have ascertained these 
conditions, we move on to logic proper.  Peirce describes logic proper as the “science of what is 
quasi-necessarily true of the representamina of any scientific intelligence in order that they may 
hold good of any object, that is, may be true” (CP 2.229). Whereas grammatica speculativa 
seeks only the conditions that would allow a sign or representamen to mean, logic proper extends 
this investigation to consider the “conditions of the truths of representations” (CP 2.229). 
 Finally, one passes from logic proper into pure rhetoric: “its task is to ascertain the laws 
by which in every scientific intelligence one sign gives birth to another, and especially one 
thought brings forth another” (CP 2.229). The project of pure rhetoric, sometimes called the 
speculative rhetoric of the sign, focuses primarily on how signs are used to convey meaning and 
what laws the signs follow when they do. Presently, we can say that Derrida is mostly interested 
in the grammatica speculativa: he is, after all, pursuing the conditions of possibility of all 
signification, and it is this first branch which deals primarily with such an investigation. 
Importantly then, and as I have shown, Derrida finds that the conditions of possibility of all 
signification do not depend on or rest on a logical foundation that persists outside of the system 
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of signs. Logic is only born of signs: “from the moment that there is meaning there are nothing 
but signs” (Derrida OG 50).  
 It is exactly after Derrida challenges—through opposing Peirce to Saussure—the 
foundations of semiotics, that he arrives at the passage I began this section with. Considering 
only the treatment of Peirce that Derrida provides, we can begin to understand why it is that 
Derrida praises Peirce for heading in the direction of the de-construction of the transcendental 
signified.  
 Peirce moves in this direction precisely because his conception of the symbol (as 
following from other symbols) challenges the “reassuring end” that followers of the metaphysics 
of presence attempt to impose on the “[referral] from sign to sign” (Derrida OG 49). If every 
symbol follows from a symbol, then there would be no end to the referral from sign to sign. 
Derrida continues: “I have identified logocentricism and the metaphysics of presence as the 
exigent, powerful, systematic, and irrepressible desire for such a signified” (49). The 
metaphysicians of presence fixate on the idea of restoring presence to the sign—they want the 
sign to signify presence instead of absence—they ground the process of signification in presence. 
This desire is systematic and powerful. It controls the flow of signifiers by restraining them 
within this narrow search for presence.  
For Derrida, Peirce resists just this desire. Indeed: 
 Peirce considers the indefiniteness of reference as the criterion that allows us to recognize 
 that we are indeed dealing with a system of signs. What broaches the movement of  
 signification is what makes its interruption impossible. The thing itself is a sign.25 (49) 
 
25 Derrida’s emphasis.  
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As I showed in my account of Peirce’s Cognition Series, the very fact that we cannot have an 
immediate intuition of the object of our conception is what leads him to hold that cognition arises 
by a continuous process—a process of signification which Short describes as an infinite regress 
and progress. It is, just as Derrida supposes, the indefiniteness of reference (the inability of the 
process of cognition (qua signs) to be traced back to a first cognition, or in Derrida’s words, an 
origin) that lets us recognize that we are dealing with a system of signs. And following, the very 
process of cognition, which allows us to broach this movement of signs, is what makes its 
interruption impossible: from the very instant that we consider the movement of signification in 
terms of a process of cognitions qua signs, we keep ourselves from being able to interrupt that 
process by fixating on the presence of the thing itself. This is because the thing itself is a sign—
we cannot reach its presence because its presence is deferred by the detour of the sign.  
This, Derrida continues, is “an unacceptable proposition for Husserl, whose 
phenomenology remains therefore—in its “principle of principles”—the most radical and most 
critical restoration of the metaphysics of presence” (Derrida OG 49). Whereas, in Husserl, the 
phenomenological idea of manifestation is to reveal a presence, for Peirce, “manifestation itself 
does not reveal a presence, it makes a sign” (49).  
 By opposing Peirce to Husserl, Derrida shows how Peirce’s semiotic circumvents the 
metaphysics of presence. If manifestation itself gives rise to a sign rather than to presence, then  
 there is thus no phenomenality reducing the sign or the representer so that the thing  
 signified may be allowed to glow finally in the luminosity of its presence. The so-called 
 “thing itself” is always already a representamen shielded from the simplicity of intuitive  
 evidence. (49) 
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Since the “thing itself” is always already a representamen for Peirce, there is no way for the 
thing itself to manifest in all of its presence, to take command of the process of signification.  
 It is also crucial to note Derrida’s claim that the representamen shields us from simplicity 
of intuitive evidence. This point is in keeping with Peirce’s denial of the faculty of intuition. 
Since there is no intuition, but all thought passes through signs, we can never have an immediate 
cognition of the presence of the thing itself.26 In this way, “the representamen functions only by 
giving rise to an interpretant that itself becomes a sign and so on to infinity” (49). Here Derrida 
is, again, referring to the continuous process of cognition qua signs. It seems as if Derrida’s 
claim finds its roots in Peirce’s doctrine of the thought-sign. As I have shown, for Peirce, “each 
former thought suggests something to the thought which follows it, i.e., is the sign of something 
to this latter” (Peirce, “Some Consequences” 67). By the doctrine of the thought-sign, each 
interpretant itself becomes a representamen from which a further interpretant is formed and so 
on. This process is interminable unless it ends in death.27  
 
26 Recall, also, the passage quoted from Derrida’s “Differance” earlier: “…the movement of signs defers 
the moment of encountering the thing itself, the moment at which we could lay hold of it, consume or 
expend it, touch it, see it, have a present intuition of it.” Even here, Derrida is cognizant of the inability to 
appeal to intuition to overcome the detour of the sign. This denial of intuition found both in Peirce and 
Derrida is a striking example of one of the many affinities the two thinkers share.  
27 I want to include a brief note on this point. My claim here is riffing off of a quote that I used in the first 
chapter where Peirce talks about how the continuous process of consciousness qua signs will only stop if 
it comes to an abrupt end in death (W2: 224). This, I think, holds true for Peirce only insofar as the end 
would occur within an individual. If I die, my train of thought is terminated—as far as I know (and I 
guess no one really knows) my consciousness will not continue to produce interpretants after I die. 
However, this does not mean I die outright—only that my thought-sign stops signifying. In a beautiful 
essay by Kieran Cashell entitled “Ex Post Facto: Peirce and the Living Signs of the Dead,” he argues that 
parts of the individual live on after death in the signs that they have left behind. I do not plan to go down 
this rabbit hole here, I only wish to point out that work has been done to show how individuals—insofar 
as they are signs—have a kind of after-life, where they are still, in a sense, alive through the signs that 
they have left behind. This is a topic which I wish to investigate further in the coming years. Though, for 
now, I can only hint at it in a footnote. It should be noted that Cashell’s analysis suggests that it is the 
same for Derrida—individuals live after they die in the traces that they leave behind.    
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 Furthermore, there is no way to trace this process back to a first cognition, a place of 
origin, a presence. Derrida thus sees in Peirce that “the self-identity of the signified [or in 
Peircean terms the self-identity of the object] conceals itself unceasingly and is always on the 
move” (49). The object (or signified or thing itself or presence) is always effaced by the 
movement of one sign to another; kept just out of reach by the detour of the sign.  
 As a result, Derrida claims that “the property of the representamen is to be itself and 
another, to be produced as a structure of reference, to be separated from itself” (49). Just after, he 
provides one iteration of Peirce’s definition of the triadic sign:  
 Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an object to which 
 itself refers (its object) in the same way, this interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so  
 on ad infinitum… If the series of successive interpretants comes to an end, the sign is  
 thereby rendered imperfect, at least. (Peirce qtd. In Derrida OG 50) 
Derrida’s reading suggests that the representamen, in Peirce’s triadic formulation of the sign, is 
separated from itself because it functions simultaneously, and in some ways paradoxically, both 
as a representation of itself as a sign of the object and as a representation for (or determining) a 
further succeeding interpretant which itself becomes a sign. If the series, or process of 
signification, comes to an end, then the sign is rendered imperfect because it ceases to continue 
signifying—is cut off from the possibility of all further signification. We find “meaning” then, 
not by constraining this movement, but by moving through it—going along with it. We find 
“meaning” in the traces of the sign; in differance, that is to say, in the difference between, and in 
the deferral of, one sign to the next.  
 It is exactly here that Jeffrey Barnouw claims Derrida takes leave of Peirce by way of a 
swift transition, from Peirce to Nietzsche, to consider the notion of play (Barnouw 80). “Having 
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quoted Peirce’s definition of the sign,” Barnouw writes, “Derrida remarks in a characteristically 
“playful” succession of thoughts” (Barnouw 80). That is, immediately after Derrida provides the 
aforementioned Peircean definition of the sign, he swiftly shifts the discussion away from Peirce 
by passing through Nietzsche to the concept of play: 
 From the moment that there is meaning there are nothing but signs. We think only in  
 signs. Which amounts to ruining the notion of the sign at the very moment when, as in  
 Nietzsche, its exigency is recognized in the absoluteness of its right. One could call play  
 the absence of the transcendental signified as limitlessness of play, that is to say as the  
 deconstruction of onto-theology and the metaphysics of presence. (Derrida OG 50) 
Barnouw, commenting on Derrida, claims that 
 the contrast with Nietzsche resumes the burden of a passage from the preceding chapter  
 in which Nietzsche is said to have “contributed a great deal to the liberation of the  
 signifier from its dependence or derivation with respect to the logos and the related truth  
 or the primary signified” (Derrida OG 19). (Barnouw 80) 
Toward Nietzsche, and away from Peirce, Derrida finds that, in the absence of the transcendental 
signified, we are left only with a semiosis (or process of signification) defined by a limitlessness 
of play. Semiosis is thought of as play, for Derrida, because the process does not move “toward a 
referent (a reality that is metaphysical, historical, psychobiographical, etc.) or toward a signified 
outside the text whose content could take place, could have taken place outside of language [or 
outside of the play of signs]” (Derrida OG 158). Recall, “There is nothing outside of the text,” 
nothing beyond the play of signifiers (or traces) (158). Consequently, the Peircean object seems 
to be swept away along with the signified—it is lost in the deferral, or what Eco calls the “drift,” 
from signifier to signifier (Eco 208). The object, or thing itself, can no longer be thought of as 
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the ideal limit of semiosis—there is no limit to signification, and without this limit, there is only 
limitlessness, or play. 
   By dropping the object along with the signified, Derrida has opened up semiosis, through 
stepping beyond Peirce to Nietzsche, to a limitlessness of play. And as Eco notes, this play 
proliferates  
 like a cancer, and at every step the previous sign is forgotten, obliterated, because the  
 pleasure of the drift is given by the process of shifting from sign to sign and there is no  
 purpose outside the enjoyment of travel through the labyrinth of signs or of things” (Eco  
 210).  
From the moment that the sign is shown, through Peirce, to be irreducible to an origin of 
presence, we are caught up in this drift. We can thus reimagine Derrida’s famous claim that there 
is nothing outside of the text to say something like: there is nothing outside of the deferral of 
signifiers or the growth of symbols qua play. Indeed, Eco thinks that, consequently, for Derrida 
(but unlike for Peirce) this irreducibility serves to raze any telos or direction or purpose from the 
process of semiosis: “there is no purpose outside the enjoyment of travel through the labyrinth of 
signs” (210). It is thus the Nietzschean liberation that Barnouw speaks of which undercuts the 
possibility of such a telos. As Leon Surette writes, in freeing us from the pitfalls of the 
metaphysics of presence (of illusion and delusion), “Derrida either liberates us into cognitive 
chaos or incarcerates us in Nietzsche’s “prison house of language”—or perhaps both” (Surette 
4). By “Nietzsche’s prison house of language,” Surette has Fredric Jameson’s famous essay in 
mind. However, the image of the prison house of language finds its source in The Will to Power. 
By shifting to Nietzsche just after this irreducibility has been marked, Derrida seems to move in 
the direction of the 522nd aphorism of Nietzsche’s The Will To Power:    
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 We cease to think when we refuse to do so under the constraint of language [or signs]; we 
 barely reach the doubt that sees this limitation as a limitation. Rational thought is   
 interpretation according to a scheme that we cannot throw off. (Nietzsche, The Will To  
 Power, aphorism 522)  
By liberating us from the metaphysics of presence, Derrida ends up imprisoning us in “a scheme 
that we cannot throw off”—we fly out of one fly-bottle and straight into another. However, if we 
harken back to our discussion of Rorty’s Derrida earlier, we will recall that this liberation (that 
Surette and Eco worry entraps us further) should not be met with disdain, but with a Nietzschean 
affirmation: when we find ourselves in the prison house of language, we say “Yes!”  
Spivak gives an account of this Nietzschean affirmation when she writes, contrary to 
Surette, that: 
Deconstruction seems to offer a way out of the closure of knowledge. By inaugurating 
the open-ended indefiniteness of textuality—by thus “placing in the abyss” (mettre en 
abîme), as the French expression would literally have it—it shows us the lure of the abyss 
as freedom. The fall into the abyss of deconstruction inspires us with as much pleasure as 
fear. We are intoxicated with the prospect of never hitting bottom. Thus a further 
deconstruction deconstructs deconstruction, both as the search for a foundation (the critic 
behaving as if she means what she says in her text), and as the pleasure of the bottomless. 
(Spivak, lxxviii) 
The “pleasure of the bottomless” that Spivak finds in Derrida echoes Eco’s claim that there is no 
purpose other than the “enjoyment” of moving through the labyrinth of signs. Though, in 
Spivak’s account, this plunging is given a kind of sex appeal—it is posed as freedom. “The fall 
into the abyss of deconstruction inspires us with as much pleasure as fear,” yet Surette seems to 
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let the fear of never hitting bottom get the better of him. By letting semiosis be defined by play, 
Derrida provides us with the means to critique and undercut any instance where philosophy 
attempts to get beyond this play by restraining it in presence. But, at the same time, there is no 
aim to try to reconstruct a working theory of truth from the ashes and rubble of the metaphysics 























 In this chapter, I have foregrounded Derrida’s reading of Peirce by tracing the movement 
of his deconstruction of the sign in Of Grammatology up until the point where he takes leave of 
Peirce to follow Nietzsche. After outlining four different Derrida(s), I followed this movement 
from a critique of Saussure (favouring the spoken word over the written word) to a 
deconstruction of the Sausurrean sign in its totality. In order to move through this movement, I 
stopped at different points, to outline Derridean terms such as “differance,” “trace,” and “play.” 
By slowly tracing Derrida’s movement, I arrived at his reading of Peirce which exposed the 
irreducibility of grounding the process of semiosis in something outside of the play of signs—we 
are forever caught up in the detour of the sign. Finally, I suggested that a main consequence of 
Derrida’s reading of Peirce is that it drops the Object from the Peircean sign. In the absence of 
this object, which acts as the ideal limit of semiosis, we are left only with “a limitlessness of 
play”. This “play” brings about a further consequence, noted by Eco and Surette, wherein we 
must replace the pursuit of truth with mere “enjoyment” and “pleasure”. This enjoyment and 
pleasure is at the expense of reality; for reality is made unobtainable, and seen as a pointless 
endeavour, within the bottomless pit of deconstruction. In accord with Derrida (but written in 
disdain), Short claims that any appeal to a “reality beyond play manifests a totalitarian impulse to 
impose his arbitrary semiotic constructions, tendentiously named ‘reality,’ on others” (Short 45). 
The pursuit of reality is usurped by play—we cannot pursue reality because to do so would be to 
give a direction, or telos, to the movement of signs. And in this way, Derrida leaves Peirce 
behind to pursue Nietzsche.  
 Now, when Derrida swiftly shifts from Peirce to Nietzsche, he is not suggesting that 
Nietzsche is somehow responding to or extending Peirce. Earlier, I mentioned that I think 
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Derrida only deploys his reading of Peirce as a kind of technology to aid in the movement of his 
deconstruction. At the moment Derrida switches to Nietzsche then, he is replacing one 
technology with another. That is to say, the Peircean technology has, at that point, done all the 
work that it was enlisted to do (show the irreducibility of the referral of signs to an origin of 
presence). And so, it is replaced, at that exact instance, with the next bit of Nietzschean 
technology, meant to move us from this irreducibility to play.  
 But why does Derrida take leave of Peirce so quickly (with such a speedy transition to 
Nietzsche)? My best guess is that he needs to, or else he risks the possibility of a Peircean reply. 
In the midst of this transition, he hopes to conceal a trace back into Peirce by burying his reading 
of Peirce in the movement of signs that follow from it. Yet, the trace to a Peircean reply still 
lingers in Of Grammatology. In fact, if Derrida is trying to conceal a Peircean reply, then by the 
very movement of deconstruction, we should attempt to unbury it. What I am suggesting is that 
the fossils of the Peircean technology that Derrida leaves behind, provide us with the very means 
(by Derrida’s own position) to reconsider the reading of Peirce that he provides—a further 
deconstruction deconstructs deconstruction. For unlike Derrida, Peirce in no way wants his 
semiotic to result in play. There is a continuity to the movement of signs, utterly unlike play in 
Derrida, that I will presently unearth from the trace Derrida leaves behind.  
 The work done in this chapter adds to the overall arch of my thesis in two main ways: 1) 
it provides a rough sketch of what Derrida is up to when he deploys his deconstruction to destroy 
the concept of the sign by opening it up to an unlimited deferral; and 2) it expounds, carefully, 
Derrida’s “reading” of Peirce which uses Peirce’s early work on signs as a means to broach this 
destruction. Derrida’s “reading” of Peirce exemplifies and builds on the crisis of meaning that I 
am trying to overcome—this crisis being one that calls into question the traditional notion that 
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truth is found in the presence of the signified. By showing that no such presence, or truth, is 
revealed by the sign, and that there is no way out of the referral from sign to sign, I have revealed 
that there is no way to have meaning from within this deferral (because meaning typically arises 
by freezing or attempting to get outside of this deferral). However, insofar as Derrida uses Peirce 
to reach this conclusion, his reading seems to suggest that Peirce allows for the same kind of 
limitlessness of play that Derrida is trying to articulate. That, if we follow Peirce’s reasoning 
about signs, we will be led to the same conclusion—that there is no meaning available to us in 
the movement from sign to sign, only deferred presence. While, for Derrida, this may be the 
case, Peirce would not subscribe to the kind of play that Derrida endorses. In the following 
chapter, I return to Peirce to further develop his notion of continuity which seems to be in direct 

















The Oceanic Gap 
The interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed 
along; and as representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series. 
—Peirce, CP 1.339 
 
I began this investigation by pointing out that I think Derrida’s reading of Peirce leads to 
a crisis of meaning. Having outlined Peirce’s early semiotic and traced Derrida’s deconstruction 
of the sign beyond his reading of Peirce, we are now in a position to name this crisis and begin to 
furnish a reply from the Peircean perspective. To begin to put a finger on the pulse of this crisis, 
I want to consider what consequences seem to follow from Derrida’s insistence that semiosis is 
defined by play. Eco nicely sums up these consequences when he writes that, after Derrida has 
liberated us from the metaphysics of presence, 
 it is thus possible to conclude that language is caught in a play of multiple signifying  
 games, that a text cannot incorporate any absolute univocal meaning, that there is no  
 transcendental signified, that the signifier is never co-present with a signified that is  
 continually deferred and delayed; and that every signifier is related to another signifier so 
 that there is nothing outside of the significant chain which goes on ad infinitum. (Eco  
 212) 
This series of conclusions, or consequences, seem to result in a crisis of meaning because, in the 
absence of the transcendental signified, we are left in a limitlessness of play within a significant 
chain that never stops signifying. Since we cannot get outside of this chain, we cannot have a 
theory of truth or meaning that would ground the chain of signs in a reality persisting outside—
there seems to be no ground for this semiosis. This inability to ground the chain of signs, results 
in a change of attitude about what the purpose of philosophy is. Philosophy is no longer 
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interested in seeking the truth, reality, meaning, or whatever—philosophy cannot reveal the 
presence of the signified from within the play from sign to sign  
 Instead, in this play, we find only a “pleasure” or “enjoyment”—not in seeking the 
truth—but from the realization that we could never reach the truth anyway, so why bother? We 
must, then, remain content with deconstructing and undercutting those philosophers who think 
that they are seeking the truth—show them why, once we pass through the detour of the sign, 
such a pursuit is as hopeless as trying to reach God through meditation. But, while we can use 
deconstruction to point out these instances where philosophers have gone astray, there is little 
attempt to rebuild, or reconstruct, once the deconstruction is underway. Indeed, it is 
deconstruction without reconstruction: it is deconstruction all the way down and into the 
bottomless pit. As Derrida writes: “The concept of play [jeu] remains beyond this opposition, on 
the eve and aftermath of philosophy, it designates the unity of chance and necessity in an endless 
calculus” (Derrida “Differance” 135). Thus, the crisis of meaning finds its footing in the 
following two ways: 1) it keeps us from ever having a conception of truth or reality so long as 
those conceptions are defined as a presence that exists outside of the semiotic chain; and 2) it 
changes our attitude toward philosophy such that, in play, we no longer care to orient ourselves 
toward truth or reality, but remain content only with the “pleasure” or “enjoyment” of freely 
falling into the abyss of deconstruction.    
 While to some, like Spivak and Bennington, this play is understood as freedom or 
liberation in a Nietzschean sense, others, like Short, think that “the denial of unambiguous 
reference is a perfect cover for someone fearful of facing reality” (Short 45). Still though, 
Derrida has shown us that we cannot remain content with pursuing the real so long as we think of 
the real as something which takes place beyond the chain of signification. If there is meaning at 
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all, and a purpose to philosophy beyond “pleasure” and “enjoyment,” it would have to function 
within this semiotic chain—within the movement of signs—because we are trapped in this 
“scheme that we cannot throw off.” 
 In order to furnish a Peircean reply to this crisis of meaning (which, I will admit, is not a 
crisis for Derrida, but is a crisis for anyone who wishes to follow Peirce), the reply would have to 
meet two criteria: 1) it must not, in any way, give in to an appeal to presence to ground the chain 
of signification; and 2) it must not circumscribe or restrain the movement from sign to sign. If, 
through Peirce, there is a way to have meaning or truth without going against either of these 
criteria, then we could rightfully respond to the second threat of the crisis of meaning and say 
that there is more to philosophy than mere “pleasure” and “enjoyment”.  To move toward this 
Peircean reply, I will show that Peirce’s pragmatist conception of reality is built out of the 
consequences outlined in his Cognition Series: that is to say, Peirce provides us with a theory of 
meaning, from within semiosis, that allows us to replace the Derridean notion of play with 
continuity.  
    The aim of this final chapter, then, is to suss out the similarities and differences 
between Peirce’s and Derrida’s account of signs. Once the similarities have been marked, we 
will see that the main difference between Peirce and Derrida is between continuity and play. And 
it is this difference that motivates a Peircean reply. I will begin by giving a treatment of the 
similarities between Peirce and Derrida that David Pettigrew notes in his essay “Peirce and 
Derrida: From sign to sign”. Afterwards, I will mark the “oceanic gap” between Peirce and 
Derrida: that of the difference of continuity and play. With Peircean continuity in mind, I will 
turn, in the second part, to attempt to bridge the gap between Peirce’s pragmatist theory of reality 
and his claims that 1) the world is perfused with signs and 2) that all thought is in signs. By 
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bridging this gap, I show that Peirce provides us with a pragmatist theory of meaning that neither 
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Peirce, Derrida, and Meaning-In-Crisis 
  
David Pettigrew’s essay “Peirce and Derrida: from sign to sign” is remarkable because he 
takes the time to try to point out two similarities between Derrida and Peirce’s theory of signs. 
Both Peirce and Derrida’s treatment of signs result in a total debunking of the traditional 
metaphysics of their respective times; and each thinker’s foray into semiotic terrain firmly 
challenges the traditional claim that we have transparent and direct access to our inner-selves 
(Pettigrew 365). By attempting to trace out these similarities, Pettigrew distances himself from 
other Peircean critics of Derrida’s reading of Peirce by, at least, attempting to draw some 
connections between the two philosophers who seem so radically different at a first glance. 
Whereas critics like Eco, Short, Barnouw, and Surette criticize Derrida’s reading of Peirce, 
Pettigrew is more charitable and carefully charts out these points of similarity. Strikingly, the 
two similarities that Pettigrew foregrounds result in a “meaning-in-crisis” for contemporary 
philosophical thought (Pettigrew 372). I will argue, however, that this crisis can ultimately be 
mitigated by focusing on Peirce’s continuity of the sign.  
 In order to see how these two similarities between Peirce and Derrida result in a 
“meaning-in-crisis,” I show, through Pettigrew, how Peirce and Derrida 1) each seem to rely on a 
notion of difference within their theory of signs; and 2) each challenge our capacity to have any 
transparent knowledge of ourselves. After these two similarities are marked, we can clearly see 
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The Similarity of Difference in Peirce and Derrida 
  
I begin with Pettigrew’s claim that both Peirce’s and Derrida’s treatment of signs rely on 
a notion of difference. Pettigrew writes: 
 Common to Derrida and Peirce… is the notion that fundamental to the relation of signs,  
 and the operation of signs as such, is a notion of difference which problematizes the  
 simple binary relation of a sign to the thing it signifies. With Derrida, différance took the  
 form of an irreconcilable break or rupture, resulting in the destruction of the sign as such,  
 while in the case of Peirce, the triadicity of signs is paradoxically “complete” insofar as it 
 results in a difference or change of habit. (Pettigrew 369) 
Let’s trace Pettigrew’s moves up until the point of this conclusion to better understand what he 
takes this similarity to consist in. To show the “irreconcilable break or rupture” that results from 
Derrida’s notion of différance, Pettigrew follows a set of passages from Derrida that we have 
already dealt with in the previous chapter. Having cited Saussure’s thesis of the arbitrariness of 
the sign and the unity of difference, the passage about the detour of the sign from Derrida’s 
“Differance,” and the string of quotations from Of Grammatology where Derrida “reads” Peirce, 
Pettigrew concludes that  
 Derrida’s appropriation of Saussure’s notion of differential negativity emphasizes that the 
 difference between the signifiers is a spatio-temporal difference; a deferral of presence.  
 What the sign or signifier signifies, then, is not its signified, but rather this very   
 displacement of the signified by the signifier. (Pettigrew 367) 
As we have seen, in Derrida, this displacement through the différance between signifier and 
signified, is what results in the rupture of the sign in its totality—the différance keeps the 
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Saussurean sign from ever being a whole unity between signifier and signified. Consequently, 
the rupture that this différance brings about (insofar as it as a spatio-temporal difference) is what 
results in the indefinite referral from sign to sign. There is no sign (as whole unity or totality) 
that could disambiguate or terminate this indefinite referral from sign to sign. Thus, it is the 
notion of différance, in Derrida, which challenges the “simple binary relation of a sign to the 
thing it signifies” (369). It is the detour of the sign which keeps us from ever having such a 
whole. 
 Shifting from Derrida to Peirce, Pettigrew proceeds to show how, like Derrida, Peirce’s 
theory of signs relies on a notion of difference (though, it is unclear at this point if Pettigrew 
means Peirce’s theory relies on différance). Pettigrew notes that for Peirce there is an ultimate 
stage to the process of semiosis called the interpretant—the most proper significant outcome of a 
process of semiosis (Pettigrew 368). Pettigrew clarifies that  
The interpretant, however, is not a terminal—or in Derrida’s terminology, a 
transcendental—signified. The interpretant is itself triadic, including its emotional, 
energetic and logical aspects—with the logical interpretant serving as the widest scope, 
or general meaning, of the sign insofar as it influences reflection and action. (368) 
Pettigrew’s reading of Peirce is remarkable because he clarifies that the interpretant is not 
beyond the triadic process of semiosis like Derrida’s transcendental signified is. The interpretant 
is itself apart of the triadic relation and can be broken down into three additional parts: the 
emotional, energetic, and logical. He continues that “the general logical interpretant would 
always be in relation to another logical interpretant, to which it is related or under which it is 
subsumed” (368). The logical interpretant is not beyond the process of signification, but is a part 
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of it.28 This logical interpretant is not the transcendental meaning of the sign, but rather, it is a 
part of the process of semiosis—is indebted to this process of semiosis and cannot be actualized 
without an object and a representamen (or sign). The final interpretant, as I will show more 
clearly in the subsequent section, is not beyond semiosis, but a product of it.  
 Pettigrew brackets the emotional and the energetic and focuses solely on the logical 
interpretant (sometimes referred to as the final interpretant of a process of semiosis). The final 
logical interpretant is the meaning of the sign in general—it is the interpretant that would stand 
once all investigation into the sign has been sufficiently exhausted. As Peirce writes to Victoria 
Welby on March 14, 1909, the final interpretant is “the effect the Sign would produce upon any 
mind upon which circumstances should permit it to work out its full effect” (Peirce Semiotic and 
Significs, 110). Notice here Peirce’s description of the final interpretant as an “effect”.29 This 
echoes my discussion earlier where Hoopes notes how the interpretant is thought of as the 
carrying out of a habit of action. Pettigrew claims that the final interpretant can be understood as 
“that of a difference or change with respect to the general concept of the logical interpretant, 
however infinitesimal that difference may be” (368). He continues: “the difference, more 
precisely, is the change of habit in which the sign results” (368). The significance (or meaning) 
of the sign is found in the difference or change in action that occurs with respect to the 
interpretation of the sign. The logical interpretant marks a difference between the habit of action 
 
28 In his letters to Victoria Welby, Peirce seems to contradict Pettigrew’s gloss here. He claims that the 
“interpretant is not necessarily a sign” (Peirce Semiotic and Significs 31). That is, the interpretant, as we 
have seen, can be considered a habit of action (which is not necessarily a sign). Yet, Eco suggests, and I 
am inclined to agree with him, that “it is true that even the practical effect must then be spelled out by and 
through signs and that the very agreement among the members of the community cannot but take the form 
of a new chain of signs” (Eco 218).  
29 Interestingly, this focus on “effect” nicely aligns with Bennington’s interpretation of Derrida when he 
writes that, after the de-construction of the transcendental signified, “there is no signified or meaning, but 
only effects of them” (Bennington 34, my emphasis). We are left, so to speak, only with the effects that 
the signifiers produce.  
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prior to the interpretation of the sign, and the habit of action which changes after the sign has 
been fully interpreted. If I do not know that fire is hot, I might act differently around fire than I 
would if I knew that it was hot. My habit of action changes once I touch the flame and it burns 
me—the mark of this change is the difference between how I acted prior to, and how I will 
continue to act after, touching the flame.  
 The notion of habit-change thus implies a kind of difference which Pettigrew likens to 
that of the difference found in Derrida (Pettigrew 368). Peirce and Derrida seem to be on the 
same page when they each challenge the traditional dyadic relation of the sign found in 
Saussure—Derrida through showing how difference marks the deferral of the signified by the 
signifier; and Peirce through showing that logical interpretant results in a difference or change in 
habit which extends the traditional dyadic relationship of signifier-signified. 
 But are these two senses of difference really similar? Or is Pettigrew making a shallow 
comparison that does not withstand critical scrutiny? Since Pettigrew stops at the above 
comparison, claiming that it is a similarity, I will have to extend his comparison to see if it really 
is. Now, when Derrida deploys the term différance, he does not just mean difference as in 
distinction, but also differance as in deferral, and differentially (or being-different) which acts as 
the condition of possibility for all meaning (Bennington 71). At the surface, it seems that 
Pettigrew’s comparison does not hold up because, while for Derrida the whole assemblage of 
différance is at play, in Peirce, the change of habit seems only to entail a difference (with an e) to 
mark a distinction between two habits of action. When Derrida talks of the différance between 
signifier and signified it is utterly unlike when Peirce talks about the difference born from a 
change in habits of action.  
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 Or is it? I want to suggest that the notion of habit-change encapsulated in Peirce’s final 
logical interpretant, in fact, resembles Derrida’s différance. In order to draw out the similarity, 
we need to take Pettigrew’s comparison a little bit further. In order to show how, in some 
respects, Derridean différance is at play in Peirce’s triadic formulation, we need to revisit the 
claim from his letter to Welby above: the final interpretant is “the effect the Sign would produce 
upon any mind upon which circumstances should permit it to work out its full effect” (Peirce 
Semiotic and Significs, 110). We have already seen how the final interpretant marks a habit-
change in the sense of difference (with an e)—this is made clear by Pettigrew in the 
aforementioned passages. To see how Peirce’s final logical interpretant also seems to entail 
differance (with an a) though, we need to fixate on the role that the “would”30 is playing in the 
above quoted passage to Welby. By emphasizing the “would,” Peirce is suggesting that the 
ultimate final habit-change that rises from the final interpretant is placed at a time sufficiently in 
the future—it is that change (or difference) that would come about were our investigation into 
the sign to be carried out indefinitely. Peirce writes that “the final interpretant is the one 
interpretive result to which every interpreter is destined to come if the sign is sufficiently 
considered” (Peirce Semiotic and Significs 111). This final interpretant is to be distinguished 
from any dynamical interpretant, “that which is experienced in each act of interpretation and is 
different in each from that of any other” (111). In the distinction between the dynamical and final 
interpretant, then, we see the distinction between the particular and the general. Whereas the 
dynamical interpretant is the interpretant of any particular encounter with a sign, the final 
interpretant is the one which would stand in the long run—is the general meaning of the sign 
once a community of interpreters has sufficiently interpreted the sign.  
 
30 Emphasized by Peirce himself.  
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 In the case of the dynamical interpretant, we see that the particular interpretation of a sign 
is different (with an e) from the other dynamical interpretants at play at time t. However, in the 
case of the final interpretant, we see that that interpretation is differant (with an a) from any 
particular dynamical interpretant at time t. That is to say, the final interpretant is, in a sense, 
always potentially deferred or put off—left to be ultimately decided by a future community. 
“Thought now depends on what is to be hereafter,” Peirce writes in “Some Consequences of 
Four Incapacities” (W2: 241). The future-bound aspect of the final interpretant (encapsulated in 
the “would”) is always potentially deferred by any particular dynamical interpretant—can never 
be guaranteed to have been reached in any particular instance of the interpretation of a sign. This 
point is made evident by Eco when he writes that “if the possibility of error is always present, 
therefore, semiosis is potentially unlimited” (Eco 216). So, we can say that dynamical 
interpretants differ from one another, that final interpretants differ from one another, but that 
final interpretants are always potentially deferred by dynamical interpretants. At any given 
instance, the change in habit marks a difference between one habit of action and another, but the 
final change of habit is always potentially put off in that particular instance. There is always the 
possibility of error residing in any particular interpretation and this is made evident by Peirce’s 
fallibilism and his insistence that we can always take another sample. If thought now does 
depend on what is to be hereafter, then it is deferred to the hereafter in any instance of the here-
and-now.    
 It seems then, that once we consider the differance between a particular dynamical 
interpretant and a final interpretant, that the kind of difference involved in Peirce’s theory of 
signs starts to resemble Derridean différance. Not only does the habit change mark a difference 
from the habit held before, but the final change of habit is always potentially deferred in any 
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particular instance of the interpretation of a sign. For Peirce though, the final interpretant does 
not take place outside of the process of semiosis—it is well with in its bounds and can 
theoretically be reached if the proper method of interpreting signs is endorsed and carried out to 
its end. There is no way of knowing that we have reached the final interpretant in any instance of 
the here-and-now. Meaning for Peirce, like for Derrida, is thus found in the movement through 
signs—in the constant investigation into the nature of the sign so as to hopefully, one day, reach 






















Having traced out how both Peirce’s and Derrida’s treatment of signs entails a notion of 
différance, Pettigrew moves to note the second instance of similarity between Peirce and 
Derrida: namely, that each thinker challenges the Cartesian position that we have direct, 
immediate, and transparent access to our inner selves. For both Peirce and Derrida, this Cartesian 
position is challenged by reducing the individual to a sign. For, at the moment that Peirce claims 
all thought is in signs and at the moment Derrida claims that there is nothing outside of the 
deferral of signs, each thinker (in their own way) is led to conclude that we, as individual human-
beings, appear as signs, and can only understand ourselves through signs.  
 For Derrida, the deferral of presence—the detour of the sign—functions doubly to 
problematize the human subject. Pettigrew notes that Derrida’s problematization finds its roots in 
his essay “Freud and the Scene of Writing.” Here, Derrida writes that “the structure of the 
psychical apparatus will be represented by a writing machine” (Derrida “Freud and…” 199). 
Following Freud in his Interpretation of Dreams, Pettigrew notes that for Derrida, “the 
energetics of the psyche are nothing if not represented by signs, images, and symbols” (Pettigrew 
369). The psyche is thus a writing machine that both produces and interprets text (i.e., signs). In 
this way then, we can only understand ourselves through signs. This is a striking similarity with 
Peirce who, as I showed in chapter one, believes that we have no direct access to our inner-
selves—no power of introspection—but that we can only understand ourselves through signs. 
For Derrida, the presence of the self, like that of the signified, is always deferred through signs—
just as we pass through the detour of the sign when trying to reach the thing-in-itself, so too do 
we pass through the detour when we attempt to perceive ourselves in the luminosity of our own 
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presence (to borrow a turn of phrase from Derrida from earlier). The sign stands in for the self, 
and so marks the absence of the self—denies us access to the pure Cartesian self. “The erasure of 
selfhood,” Derrida claims, “is constituted by the threat or anguish of its irremediable 
disappearance, of the disappearance of its disappearance” through, we might add, the detour of 
the sign (Derrida “Freud and…” 230). Pettigrew thus concludes that, for Derrida, “just as 
difference amounts to the destruction of the sign, so it cleaves and erases the self as simple 
presence to itself” (Pettigrew 370). So, the same process of deconstruction that Derrida applies to 
the Saussurean sign functions doubly to deconstruct the Cartesian claim that we have transparent 
access to our mental states.  
 Similarly, and as I have shown in my treatment of Peirce’s Cognition Series in chapter 
one, Peirce challenges the Cartesian assumption that we have direct access to our inner-selves—
he both denies our power of intuition and introspection, the two cognitive faculties often thought 
to bestow us with such direct access. In “Some Consequences,” Peirce claims that “when we 
think, then, we ourselves, as we are at that moment, appear as a sign” (W2: 223). Since all 
thought is in signs, we can only think about ourselves through signs—there is no way to get to 
our self, as it really is, without passing through signs.  
 Consequently, we discover that “the content of consciousness, the entire phenomenal 
manifestation of mind, is a sign resulting from inference” (W2: 240). A few moments later he 
claims that  
 For, as the fact that every thought is a sign, taken in conjunction with the fact that life is a 
 train of thought, proves that man is a sign; so, that every thought is an external sign,  
 proves that man is an external sign. That is to say, the man and the external sign are  
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 identical, in the same sense in which the words homo and man are identical. Thus my  
 language is the sum total of myself; for the man is the thought. (W2: 241)   
The symbol that a person uses is the person, just as the person using the symbol is a symbol. 
There is thus no difference between the person and the symbol that the person uses—the person 
is a sign, a person-sign. Pettigrew argues that “the status of this person-sign must be seen, then, 
in terms of Peirce’s treatment of the growth of signs—the process he interrogates under the 
heading of semiosis” (Pettigrew 370). Just as symbols grow, so do person-signs. Our habits of 
action shift and change as we, and the symbols we use, grow and evolve through time. The self is 
only represented, triadically fragmented, and caught in the movement of difference (Pettigrew 
370). 
  Following Vincent Colapietro, a notable scholar of Peirce’s theory of signs and self, 
Pettigrew claims that the person-sign is both futural and conditional: “that is to say, not fully 
formed in the present, depending rather, on the hereafter; and in a way it is other than itself” 
(Pettigrew 370). Here Pettigrew and Colapietro are borrowing from the passage just quoted 
above where Peirce claims that “thought now depends on what is to be hereafter, so that it only 
has a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the community” (W2: 241). 
Colapietro adds to Pettigrew’s discussion that the notion of the person-sign, insofar as it is 
future-oriented and conditional, requires the notion of a community: “the individual self is, in its 
innermost being, not a private sphere but a communicative agent” (Colapietro, 1989: 79). At any 
given instance, the self is “always incomplete” and “inherently unrealizable” (Colapietro, 1989: 
76). This is because the self depends and is ultimately constituted by each future thought that 
takes place hereafter. The individual in the here-and-now “is only a negation” (W2: 242) of what 
would be in the long run—the individual is only a negation of the community of inquirers.  
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 Thus, for both Peirce and Derrida, at the moment one challenges the relation of the sign 
to its object, one simultaneously “rends the fabric of the subject, overturning or decentering the 
simple [Cartesian] self-certainty which would be thought to be at the archic centre of the self” 
(Pettigrew 371). Not only do both Peirce and Derrida share a similar notion of différance, they 
both also challenge traditional accounts of the self, by reducing the self to a sign.  
 Both of these similarities meld to reinforce the crisis of meaning. Not only is it the case 
that we cannot have a theory of meaning, truth, or reality, that relies on an appeal to presence, 
but, by the same thrust, we lose access to our inner selves—what it is that makes us us. The 
reduction of everything (meaning, truth, reality, self… and so on) to signs, is what is at stake in 
this crisis of meaning—it is the consequence, for all of us, which stems from Peirce and 
Derrida’s shared belief that there is no way outside of the movement from sign to sign. In this 
way, both thinker’s projects can be understood as challenging the traditional assumptions that 
philosophers have held about truth, reality, and the self—each, in their own right, is offering a 
way out of the metaphysics of presence by focusing on the movement from sign to sign.  
 However, Derrida exits the metaphysics of presence and enters into a limitlessness of 
play, whereas Peirce takes the same exit but wants to maintain that there is a continuity to the 
movement of signs. In my second chapter, I have already given an account of the kind of play 
that Derrida has in mind, and I have considered the consequences of such a play in the 
introduction to this chapter. Now I turn to outline Peirce’s view of continuity, in order to begin to 
reply to Derrida’s insistence that semiosis is defined by play. For, as Pettigrew notes, “in spite of 
the co-problematic with respect to the disruption of metaphysics which is being suggested here, 
there is a notion of continuity fundamental to Peirce’s project which is not present in Derrida’s 
work” (Pettigrew 372). 
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Continuity and the Categories 
  
To understand why it is that Peirce believes there is a continuity to the movement from 
sign to sign, we need to consider again his categories of being: Firstness, Secondness, and 
Thirdness.31 In a rough sketch of the first chapter of his unfinished book, A Guess At The Riddle, 
Peirce gives yet another account of his categories of being: 
 The First is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor lying behind 
 anything. The Second is that which is what it is by force of something to which it is a  
 second. The Third is that which is what it is owing to things between which it mediates  
 and which it brings into relation to each other. (W6: 170) 
The First cannot be thought without ruining what it is (because to think it is already to put it into 
relation with a Second). This is to say that, for Peirce, “the First must be entirely separated from 
all conception of or reference to anything; for what involves a Second is itself a second to that 
second” (W6: 170). The First precedes thought. It is difficult to describe or convey the First—
impossible to, without thinking of a Second. “Stop to think of it [the First],” Peirce writes, “and 
it has flown!” (W6: 170). Despite this inability to articulate Firstness on its own, Peirce at least 
attempts to frame the category through the following example:  
 What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn  
 any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence,—that is first, present,  
 immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and  
 evanescent. (W6: 170-71) 
 
31 Peirce is not consistent with whether or not he capitalizes the categories. When he first announces 
them, they are all capitalized. However, as he continues, he sometimes does not capitalize them. For the 
sake of consistency, I will capitalize them in each instance that I use the terms. However, to remain 
faithful to Peirce, when I am directly quoting from his text, I will not capitalize them if he does not. 
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Remarkably, the First precedes “all synthesis and all differentiation” (W6: 171). In this way, it 
would even be prior to Derridean différance because a difference or differance is always between 
two things, spatially or temporally, and, in this way, requires a Second (a space of being-
different, or an interval32 of differance, between two things). The First is the condition of 
possibility of all possible interpretations of the sign. It is, in a way, the very interpretability of the 
sign—the potential of the sign to be fully interpreted by a mind that could actually comprehend 
it. The First is, in this sense, of the mode of being a possibility—it is the Absolute First which 
makes all that follows it possible.   
 The Second cannot be thought without the First. The Second requires a First to be made 
possible. But to think the Second in its “perfection” we must, at least for a moment, “banish 
every third” (W6: 171). Peirce writes:  
 [The Second] meets us in such facts as Another, Relation, Compulsion, Effect,   
 Dependence, Independence, Negation, Occurrence, Reality, Result [, and Difference I  
 might add]. A thing cannot be other, negative, or independent, without a first to or of  
 which it shall be other, negative, or independent… The genuine second suffers and yet  
 resists, like dead matter, whose existence consists in its inertia. (W6: 171) 
The Second, as I showed earlier with Peirce’s example of the steam whistle, is the brute thrust of 
reality that impinges on us. It is quite independent of what you or I think about it. Its existence, 
indeed, consists in its “inertia”—it is unchanging and unaffected by the vagaries of any one 
individual. “We find secondness in occurrence,” Peirce writes, “because an occurrence is 
something whose existence consists in our knocking up against it” (W6: 171). An occurrence 
takes place in space and time—it happens at a particular instance within space and time. The 
 
32 I use “space” and “interval” carefully here to account for the spatio-temporal nature of différance.  
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Second is the “knocking up against it”—a force or collision, an action and reaction. I bang my 
hand against the table; the table resists. Secondness.  
 Interestingly, in this iteration of Secondness, Peirce seems to focus on a kind of finality 
that is part and parcel with the Second, or absolute Last. Peirce continues:  
 Note, too, that for the Second to have the Finality that we have seen belongs to it, it must  
 be determined by the first immoveably, and thenceforth be fixed; so that unalterable  
 fixity becomes one of its attributes. (W6: 171) 
While the First makes the Second possible, the Second marks the ideal limit of all possibility 
insofar as it is fixed and unmoved.  
 Earlier, I claimed that the Object in Peirce’s triadic formulation relates to Secondness. 
This is still the case. However, now we need to make a distinction between two types of objects: 
the dynamical object, and the immediate object. This distinction will mark, yet again, the 
difference between the particular and the general. The immediate object is the object which is 
conceived through the sign in any given instance of interpretation—it is the representamen of the 
object to the beholder at time t. On the one hand, when I interpret the weathercock blowing 
north, I interpret the immediate object (through the representamen of course) of the weathercock. 
On the other hand, the dynamical object relates closer to the kind of Secondness—as Finality—
that Peirce is expressing in his Guess at the Riddle. Eco muses that “every semeiosic act is 
determined by a Dynamical Object—as such still external to the circle of semeiosis—which is 
“the reality which by some means contrives to determine the sign to its representamen” (CP 
4.5365)” (Eco 217). Peirce also writes that “an endless series of representations, each 
representing the one behind it, may be conceived to have an absolute object as its limit” (CP 
1.339). The dynamical object acts as this limit—it is never present within semiosis (only the 
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immediate object is). The dynamical object, as Secondness, is what would mark the terminus of 
the movement from sign to sign. It is made out to be the ideal limit—reality—toward which a 
given chain of signs is gravitating.  
 We can thus think of the First and Second then, in terms of semiosis, as follows: we see 
the First as the condition that makes a semiosis possible and the Second as the ideal limit of the 
semiosis—the real which would terminate the movement from sign to sign in the long run.  
Peirce writes that 
 First and Second, agent and patient, Yes and No, are categories which enable us roughly  
 to describe the facts of experience, and they satisfy the mind for a very long time. But at  
 last they are found inadequate, and the Third is the conception which is then called for.  
 The Third is that which bridges over the chasm between the absolute first and last, and  
 brings them into relationship. (W6: 172)  
The Third functions to bring the First and Second into relation with one another. For example, 
the interpretant is a Third which brings a representamen into relation with its immediate object 
so that it signifies X. Similarly, a sign can be a Third which stands between an interpretant and 
an object. 
 The First (as absolute First) and the Second (as absolute Last) can be represented as the 
first and last point of a line: 
First (Possibility)—————————————————————Second (last, ideal limit, 
          dynamical object) 
The line between the First and Last makes a continuum. The First is the origin, and the Last, the 
terminus—each point between the First and Last being somewhere between the condition which 
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makes semiosis possible and the reality that we bump up against when we investigate.33 The 
process of semiosis stretches between this First and Last—we, as person-signs, can never reach 
the origin or terminus. We exist, within semiosis, somewhere between these two points of the 
line.  
 Indeed, each point on the line is a Third which helps to make sense of, or reconcile, the 
movement from First to Last. Peirce claims that:  
 …the third is the action by which the former influences the latter. Between the beginning  
 as first, and the end as last, comes the process which leads from first to last. (W6: 172)  
This process is the process of semiosis—the movement of signs which bridge the chasm between 
First and Last. Unlike in Derrida, however, this process is not defined by a limitlessness of play, 
rather, it is limited by this dynamical object (Last) which serves as the ideal limit of the 
movement from sign to sign within the continuum between First and Last. By placing semiosis 
within a continuum, Peirce is able to restore a direction to the movement of signs which is not 
present in Derrida. There is thus, as Eco points out, a kind of purpose, or telos, involved in the 
idea of semiosis for Peirce (Eco 216). The movement of signification is tending, from this First, 
toward this Last. We do not find meaning by trying to get to either the First or Last, but rather, 
by recognizing the Thirds, or signs, which serve to mediate between this First and Second which 
are forever unreachable. We cannot focus on any one category in particular, but must recognize 
the complex triadic relations which hold all three together at once.  
 Peirce writes that 
 
33 We might also think of this as a continuum between 0 and 1, each point between 0 and 1 being a 
fraction within the continuum. In Putnam’s essay Peirce’s Continuum he provides an account of Peirce’s  
continuum in the philosophy of mathematics. Peirce, in his Guess at the Riddle, also mentions the 
connection of his continuum with the line in mathematics. I wanted to point out this connection, but it is 
not pertinent to our discussion here. Origin and terminus will suffice.  
   
 
104 
 These two points are the absolute first and the absolute last or second, while every  
 measurable point on the line is of the nature of a third… If you think the measurable is all 
 there is, and deny it any definite tendency whence or whither, then you are considering  
 the pair of points that makes the absolute to be imaginary and are an Epicurean. If you  
 hold that there is a definite drift to the course of nature as a whole, but yet believe its  
 absolute end is nothing but the nirvana from which it set out, you make the two points of  
 the absolute to be coincident, and are a pessimist. But if your creed is that the whole  
 universe is approaching in the infinitely distant future a state having a general character  
 different from that toward which we look back in the infinitely distant past, you make the 
 absolute to consist in two distinct real points and are an evolutionist. (W6: 173) 
Peirce is an evolutionist in this respect. The process of semiosis is approaching this infinitely 
distant future (reality) while, at the same moving from the First which makes the movement 
possible. These two points are not the same; they are distinct yet held together by the movement 
from sign to sign between them. Indeed, in his famous October 12th letter to Welby, Peirce 
claims that “a sign is something by knowing which, we know something more” (Peirce, Semiotic 
and Significs 31-2). If 1) the sign mediates between the First and Last, and 2) by knowing the 
sign we know something more, then it follows that the process of semiosis is, in someways, 
moving toward a Last which is distinct from, yet still indebted to the First—it is, by the same 
movement, moving toward an increase in knowledge, or a final interpretant, which would furnish 
our acquaintance with the object being represented by the sign.   
 Derrida, on the other hand, seems to fall somewhere between an Epicurean and a 
Pessimist. He remains in Secondness, and does not posit a Third, which would give a purpose to 
the movement from sign to sign. For Derrida, by knowing a sign we do not know something 
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more. We do not even know the sign in its totality—we only have the signifier which defers the 
presence of the signified thus keeping us from ever knowing the sign at all. Derrida thus denies 
semiosis “any definite tendency whence or whither” (W6: 173). The tendency or continuity 
found in Peirce is replaced by play for Derrida. But by replacing this tendency with play, Derrida 
ends up polluting reality with fiction.  
 In his March 14 letter to Welby, Peirce describes the bitter fate of John Stuart Mill, who 
has a “dreary outlook upon a world in which all that can be loved, or admired, or understood, is 
figment” (Peirce Semiotic and Significs 118). One can imagine Peirce directing a similar 
criticism toward Derrida, whose emphasis on play (insofar as it neglects the import of a Third) 
seems to permit that fiction, or the unreal, is all that we can hold on to in the movement from 
sign to sign.  
 Peirce’s scholastic realism, however, suggests that Thirds are real34 and that there is a real 
tendency to the movement from sign to sign—that as we move along, so long as we do with the 
right method, we will approximate reality. If it be that we could, with the right method, actually 
gravitate toward the real as it really is, then we would find the means to challenge Derrida’s 
instance that there is only play. For if there really is a real that we are tending toward, it would 





34 One might wish to investigate Peirce’s “Lectures on Pragmatism” to understand why it is that he 
believes Thirds are real. The piece begins with Peirce claiming: “I proceed to argue that Thirdness is 
operative in nature” (MS 309). The law of gravity is, in fact, a Third which is real. If Peirce holds a stone 
up, he can predict, rightfully, that upon letting it go it will fall to the ground. There is a real law, in 
general, which holds for all objects—that when they are dropped, they will fall.  
   
 
106 
The Link: Peirce’s Realism and his Semiosis 
  
So far I have suggested that by considering Peirce’s categories we can begin to see why 
the process of semiosis is tending toward reality and is not, as Derrida supposes, defined by a 
limitlessness of play. This move is made effective by placing the process of semiosis within a 
continuum which is ever so slowly approximating, asymptotically, the ideal limit, or dynamical 
object. Now, to say that semiosis occurs in a continuum is not enough to overcome Derridean 
play. We may very well be caught in such a continuum, but that does not necessarily mean that 
we are always tending toward the ideal limit. We do not magically head in the right direction. 
Peirce would be the first to admit that there is always the potential of error involved in 
interpretation and that we often get things wrong. However, Peirce does believe that if we could 
discover the right kind of method of interpreting signs, then we would be equipped with the tools 
necessary to, at least, theoretically reach this ideal limit only insofar as we carry out the method 
indefinitely.  
 In the Fixation of Belief, Peirce is trying to work out the best method for fixing our 
beliefs. Having criticized the methods of authority, tenacity, and a-priority, he eventually 
concludes that it is the method of scientific investigation that would give us the best chance of 
understanding reality. Peirce’s conception of the scientific method requires a communal 
consensus to attain knowledge—that “the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion” 
(W3: 248) but that such a settlement can only be reached in the indefinite long run. While Peirce 
holds that “all human thought and opinion contains an arbitrary, accidental element, dependent 
on the limitations in circumstances, power, and bent of the individual” (W2: 468), in “The 
Fixation of Belief” he describes the fundamental hypothesis of science as holding that “there are 
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real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them” (W3: 254). In 
short, there is an external permanency, or dynamical object, which is independent “from the one-
sidedness of [the inquirers’] idiosyncrasies” (W2: 469) that the scientific method gravitates 
toward. In this way, Peirce claims that to deploy the scientific method fruitfully “essentially 
involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of an indefinite 
increase of knowledge” (W2: 239). A communal scientific enterprise, conceived of as a 
constantly evolving practice, gives individual inquirers a way to tease out their idiosyncrasies by 
comparing and contrasting their various opinions about the object of their conception in hopes of 
arriving at a future consensus.  
 In his review of “Fraser’s The Works of George Berkeley” Peirce states: “let any human 
being have enough information and exert enough thought upon any question, and the result will 
be that he will arrive at a certain definite conclusion, which is the same that any other mind will 
reach under sufficiently favourable circumstances” (W2: 468). Consequently, scientific 
knowledge resides in the final opinion, or the consensus, or the final interpretant, that the 
community would reach were it to carry out its investigation indefinitely. For Peirce, “different 
minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries 
them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion” (W3: 273). “The opinion 
which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate,” Peirce claims, “is what we 
mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real” (W3: 273). In this way, 
Peirce argues that “we individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy 
which we pursue; we can only seek it, therefore, for the community of philosophers” (W2: 212). 
This final opinion, then, exists in a time sufficiently in the future, and only through continuous 
application of the method of scientific investigation can we ever hope to approximate it. 
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 Little work has been done to link the indefinite process of scientific investigation with 
Peirce’s work on signs. Though, it seems clear that the links are abundant. I want to suggest that 
the method of scientific investigation takes place within the continuum between First and Last 
(First and Second) which I have been tracing in the previous section. It is the very method, that, 
if deployed indefinitely, would ensure that we are constantly tending in the right direction. 
Consider how Peirce’s view of scientific investigation is tending, in the long run, toward a 
conception of reality. The process of semiosis simultaneously moves from the First toward the 
Last as we embark on the method of scientific investigation. The agreement that the community 
would reach, might resemble the form of the final logical interpretant which brings the sign into 
relation with its object, such that we have a conception of the object (reality) through the sign 
and interpretant. 
  This link between the process of semiosis and the method of scientific investigation is 
perhaps made most clear by Peirce in the following passage from his “Basis of Pragmaticism:” 
 Now thought is of the nature of a sign. In that case, then, if we can find out the right  
 method of thinking and can follow it out—the right method of transforming signs—then 
 truth can be nothing more nor less than the last result to which the following out of this  
 method would ultimately carry us. (EP 2.380) (my emphasis) 
Strikingly, Peirce is here describing, in a different way, the same method of scientific 
investigation that he outlined in the “Fixation” and the Cognition Series. Only here, Peirce is 
describing the method as a method of transforming signs. This passage seems to me to link 
Peirce’s method of scientific investigation with his process of semiosis—to say that the two go 
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hand in hand. The method of scientific investigation is a method of interpreting signs—the best 
one, at that. It is a method of signtific35 investigation.  
 Now in light of this connection, let’s consider again the aforementioned line from 
Peirce’s “How to Make Our Ideas Clear:”   
 The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we  
 mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. (W3: 273) 
There are closer readers of Peirce and the secondary scholarship surrounding Peirce than I, but in 
my limited studies as a graduate student, I have not found anyone who has remarked on the 
striking similarity that this passage shares with Peirce’s triadic formulation of the sign. And the 
object represented in this opinion is the real… And the object represented (as through a sign) in 
this opinion (the final interpretant) is the real. The object is represented through a sign in an 
opinion, or interpretant; and that object so represented in the interpretant is the real. 
  In his October 12th letter to Welby Peirce defines the sign thus:  
 A sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on the one hand and to an  
 interpretant on the other in such a way as to bring the interpretant into a relation to the  
 object corresponding to its own relation to the object. (Peirce Semiotic and Significs 32) 
The sign is of an immediate object which stands in for the dynamical object on the one hand and 
to an interpretant on the other. The sign functions as a middle here to bring the interpretant into a 
kind of conformity with the dynamical object that the sign is an immediate object of. Still, the 
dynamical object is not present in this interpretant. Eco writes: 
 
35 This is my term. And I think it is quite funny considering Derrida’s “différance” which, in the French 
language, cannot be distinguished phonetically. Similarly, when I speak the word “signtific” in English, 
you do not know whether I am saying “scientific” or “signtific”. More seriously though, it also opens up 
the term “science” to a broader meaning. The signtific method is not narrowly deployed in laboratories, 
but more generally, is conceived of as a method of interpreting signs.  
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 When the interpretation is produced, the dynamical object is no more there… But the  
 presence of the representamen, as well as the presence (in mind or elsewhere) of the  
 Immediate Object, means that in someway the Dynamical Object, which is not there, was 
 somewhere. Being not present, or not-being-there, the Object of an act of interpretation  
 has been. Moreover, that Dynamical Object that was, and which is absent in the ghost of  
 the Immediate One, to be translated into the potentially infinite chain of its interpretants,  
 will be, or ought to be. (Eco 218) 
The sign thus has two objects: “its object as it is represented [immediate object] and its object in 
itself [dynamical object]” (Peirce Semiotic and Significs 32). Furthermore, the sign has three 
different types of interpretants: “its interpretant as represented or meant to be understood [final 
interpretant], its interpretant as it is produced [dynamical interpretant], and its interpretant in 
itself [immediate interpretant]” (Peirce Semiotic and Significs 32). The Final Opinion then, is the 
final interpretant—the way the interpretant is meant36 to be understood—which brings the 
community, through the mediation of signs, into relation with the immediate object of their 
conception.  
 But in the instance of a final interpretant, this immediate object closely approximates the 
dynamical object (reality) precisely because it is the final, or last interpretant of the signifying 
chain. Peirce writes “that to which the representation should conform is itself something in the 
nature of a representation, or sign—something noumenal, intelligible, conceivable, and utterly 
unlike a thing in itself” (EP 3.80). The dynamical object is not present, but its ghost lingers so 
closely to the immediate object in this Final Opinion that, until doubt calls us to inquire again, 
we might be satisfied that we have actually come to terms with reality.  
 
36 Notice the tendency, or telos, encapsulated in the “meant” here.  
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 The method of scientific (signtific) investigation is thus a method of transforming signs—
a way forward that would allow us to have a conception of reality, in the long run, were we to 
continually apply it to the immediate objects of our conception. It is a method which maps nicely 
onto Peirce’s triadic formulation of the sign and his view that semiosis takes place within a 
continuum. For we, as person-signs (or semiotic beings), find ourselves within this continuum, 
this semiosis. But in order to tend, in the long run, toward this final opinion (or interpretant) we 
cannot, with Derrida, define the process as a limitlessness of play. Rather, with the right method 
of transforming signs, and a community of semiotic beings backing us, we can move along with 
the movement toward this end, reality. We never will, of course, reach the end—we are in the 
continuum and can only approximate it asymptotically—but the point is not to reach the end. The 
point is to continue to inquire, to never be satisfied with our state of knowledge at time t, but to 
always be open to further signification—further investigation. If, with Derrida, we leave 
ourselves to play, we will give up on the potential of arriving at a conception of reality in the 
long run—we will let fictions dictate our lives.  
 For the real springs forth in opposition to the unreal or illusion—it is not a private 
figment of any one individual’s imagination, but is public and accessible to a community of 
inquirers in the indefinite long run. Derridean play is different from Peircean continuity, then, in 
the following way: whereas play is emblematic of, what Peirce calls, “an ens relative to private 
inward determinations, to the negations belonging to idiosyncrasy,” continuity is of  “an ens such 
as would stand in the long run” (W2: 239). “Thus,” Peirce writes, “the very origin of the 
conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a 
COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of an indefinite increase in knowledge” 
(W2: 239). Through the formation of a community of semiotic beings, we negate the many 
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negations (or vagaries, or play) of any one individual by slowly distilling our private inward 
idiosyncrasies within the public opinion of the community of inquirers. The play slowly becomes 
constrained as we asymptotically approximate the end of inquiry.  
 Indeed, for Peirce, we are physiologically disposed to approximate this end insofar as we 
are irritated by doubt to inquire so as to have true beliefs about reality—the irritation of doubt 
leads us to inquire to have a state of belief (W3: 247). In A Guess At The Riddle Peirce claims 
that  
 the ultimate effect of this will be that a habit [final logical interpretant]37 gets established  
 of at once reacting in the way which removes the source of irritation; for this habit alone  
 will be strengthened at each repetition of the experiment, while every other will tend to  
 become weakened at an accelerated rate (W6: 192).  
As we move toward this end, we develop habits of action which are closer aligned with reality. 
Consequently, as we inch ever closer, the play becomes weakened at an “accelerated rate.” The 
closer we get to reality, the less play there is.  
 Now, we may be content to play for a while, but Peirce teaches us that sooner or later 
reality will impinge on us, and in that occurrence—when we first knock up against it—a seed of 
doubt is planted that calls into question the very play that we have enveloped ourselves in. This 
seed of doubt marks the first instance of our gaining a sense of direction within the movement 
from sign to sign.   
 If we return, now, to my example of the Derridean driving their car through the endless 
detour of the sign, we might imagine them smashing into the driver ahead of them. This is reality 
 
37 I add this to maintain the consistency I have developed between Peirce’s method of scientific 
investigation and his semiotic. By showing how the habit change which Peirce is speaking of here can 
also be understood as a final logical interpretant, I keep the semiotic closely interwoven with Peirce 
method of scientific investigation.  
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in its most brute force. It is “hard and tangible… forced upon us… In youth [or in play] the 
world is fresh and we seem free;” Peirce writes, “but limitation, conflict, constraint, and 
secondness generally, make up the teaching of experience: 
  
 With what firstness 
  The scarfed bark puts from her native bay 
 With what secondness 
           doth she return 
  With overweathered ribs and ragged sails” (W6: 171-72).38  
The limitlessness of play is thwarted by reality impinging. And it impinges on us all the time. 
The Derridean cannot go on playing forever. Eventually they will hit the bottom of the 
bottomless pit.39 And when they do, they may come to have a real doubt about their conception 
of play. The Peircean can only hope, that faced with this brute Second, this genuine doubt, the 







38 I maintain the unconventional formatting to capture the poetic spacing of Peirce’s writing in this 
passage. 
39 I am aware that a bottomless pit, by definition, cannot have a bottom. What I am trying to express is 
that it is only Derrida who thinks that the bottomless pit is, indeed, bottomless. With the addition of the 
dynamical object (as ideal limit) we see that the bottomless pit really does have a bottom—it is just a pit. 
The Derridean may plunge into it thinking that it is bottomless, but they eventually hit the bottom—
reality. The bottomless is found to have a bottom after all.   
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The Two Criteria Met 
 
 Throughout the course of this final chapter I have tried to outline why it is that, for 
Peirce, the process of semiosis is tending, in the long run, toward a kind of Finality that is reality. 
Furthermore, I tried to show, by linking the gap between Peirce’s method of scientific 
investigation and his semiotic, that if we can fashion the right method of transforming signs, we 
can restore a sense of direction to the movement from sign to sign—find the means to 
approximate reality through the interpretation of signs. Afterwards, I suggested that, in the very 
act of approximating this reality, the notion of Derridean play (insofar as it seems to be inward 
and private) is slowly reduced and dissolved by the uptake of a communal enterprise. I even 
suggested that, physiologically, we are disposed to move toward this end and that even the most 
liberated Derridean would be bound to face reality eventually.  
 At the beginning of this chapter, however, I suggested that in order for Peircean 
continuity to rightfully respond to Derridean play, it would need to meet two criteria: 1) it must 
not, in any way, give in to an appeal to presence to ground the chain of signification; and 2) it 
must not circumscribe or restrain the movement from sign to sign. Does the continuity of 
semiosis, once melded with Peirce’s method of signtific investigation, satisfy these criteria? I am 
inclined to say that it does for the following reasons:  
 Firstly, Peirce’s notion of the ultimate truth—as found in the final logical interpretant—
does not reveal the presence of the dynamical object (reality in its unmoving fixity). Rather, as I 
showed through Eco, the presence of the dynamical object is absent within the triadic 
formulation of the sign. In each instance of interpretation, we have only the immediate object—
itself mediated by the representamen (or sign). The dynamical object is not present, it is a ghost 
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which lingers behind the immediate object (which is itself a sign). Still though, the dynamical 
object is not erased completely… it is still somewhere—just not present in any given instant. To 
encapsulate what I mean by this, I might follow Derrida and put the Dynamical Object sous 
rature: Dynamical Object. It is not present, but it is still legible. It is still the Finality at the 
opposite end of the line between First and Last. But by crossing it out, we can see more clearly 
why it is not fully present in the final logical interpretant at the end of inquiry. 
 The second criterion, however, is harder to meet. In the case of the final logical 
interpretant—insofar as it is a habit of action—it seems, at first glance, to freeze the movement 
from sign to sign. It would put an end to the movement from sign to sign insofar as the 
production of a habit seems, at least temporarily, to freeze the process of semiosis within a 
pragmatic context. But this is only the case if we think that we have, indeed, arrived at such a 
final interpretant. As I tried to point out though, we can never be certain that we have reached the 
end of inquiry in any given moment precisely because all thought in the here-and-now depends, 
for Peirce, on what is to be hereafter. While the formation of a habit in the here-and-now may 
freeze the movement from sign to sign for some time, in order to truly remain a fallibilist, one 
must always be open to the potential of further signification. This very potential suggests that we 
can never remain content with freezing the movement from sign to sign. We must always be 
willing to take another sample, run another experiment, carry our inquiry a little bit further. We 
must always entertain the possibility that, while we are in a state of belief now, a future doubt 
may irritate us to inquire yet again. In this sense, then, we can never, by Peirce’s own fallibilism, 
completely freeze the movement from sign to sign—there is always the potential of the semiosis 
to continue signifying.  
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 In this way then, I like to think of Peircean inquiry as a Sisyphusean struggle. We find 
ourselves, like Sisyphus, at the foot of a mountain, doomed (potentially) to inquire for all 
eternity. We move and push the rock of inquiry all the way to the top. It rolls back down. In our 
descent, we are free from the weight of inquiry—from the irritation of doubt. This descent 
resembles a temporarily stable belief—“at each of those moments when he leaves the heights and 
gradually sinks toward the lairs of the gods, he is superior to his own fate… He is stronger than 
his rock” (Camus 121). But Camus warns us that “one always finds one’s burden again” (Camus 
123). We always need to be ready to lift the rock of inquiry if doubt calls us to once more. 
Indeed, it is not the end of inquiry that matters, but the moving toward the end: “the struggle 
itself towards the heights is enough to fill a man’s heart” (Camus 123). Like Sisyphus, we must 
imagine that the inquirer is happy.    
 Thus, by considering Peirce’s mature semiotic and its relation to both the categories and 
his method of signtific investigation, I have shown that Peirce is able to meet both of the criteria 
set out at the beginning of this chapter. He neither gives in to the metaphysics of presence, nor 
permanently freezes the movement from sign to sign. Rather, he shows us, that by placing 
semiosis within a continuum, and furnishing the right method of investigation, we are able to 












 What then of the crisis of meaning and of the difference between continuity and play in 
Peirce and Derrida? Throughout the course of this investigation I have tried to show that, while 
Peirce and Derrida both maintain that we are caught up in an unlimited semiosis, they express 
different attitudes about how to cope with such a semiosis. Whereas Derrida takes semiosis to 
result in a limitlessness of play in which the hope of reaching truth and reality are replaced by 
pleasure and enjoyment, Peirce opts to develop a method of transforming signs, from within 
semiosis, that allows us to tend toward reality in the indefinite long run.  
 This difference in attitude suggests that at the moment we are faced with unlimited 
semiosis, we have a choice: either we can, with Derrida, say “Yes!” and embrace the play in the 
movement from sign to sign; or we can, with Peirce, maintain a cheerful hope that, with the right 
method, we can nonetheless approximate reality. As Pettigrew suggests, the difference between 
Peirce and Derrida is like that of the difference between Nietzsche’s “artistic” and “scientific” 
tendencies:  
 The artistic tendency celebrates the limitless variability of nature—what Nietzsche  
 considers as an infinite metaphoricity. The scientific tendency forgets the metaphoricity  
 of nature, setting a structure in place to control that very metaphoricity. (Pettigrew 375)  
While Derrida celebrates the artistic tendency, Peirce celebrates the scientific tendency.  
 I find myself being pulled in both directions. On the one hand, if Pettigrew’s assessment 
is right, then I can imagine Derrida replying that Peirce’s move to develop a method of 
transforming signs is just another attempt to govern the limitlessness of play—his terms “reality” 
and “continuity” and his “method of scientific investigation” are really just master-words that 
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circumscribe the freedom of play. We might then, following Bennington’s Derrida, say that 
when Peirce chooses the method of scientific investigation he is choosing the empirical over the 
transcendental without realizing that, in doing so, he puts the empirical in a transcendental 
position with respect to transcendence and is thus bogged down by all that contraband that he 
tries to cast to wayside. 
 On the other hand, however, Peirce teaches that we cannot be content to play forever. I 
have tried to show that play leads to the production of fictions insofar as it lends itself to 
idiosyncrasy. Furthermore, I have shown that reality (or Secondness) impinges on us, and that 
when it does, we are often physiologically disposed to come to terms with it. By coming to terms 
with reality, through the method of signtific investigation, the play in Derrida slowly subsides. It 
is true that by endorsing such a method we are circumscribing the play of signs. But, I have tried 
to show that, in doing so, we do not give in to the metaphysics of presence. This is precisely 
because the method of scientific investigation takes place within the same continuum that 
semiosis does—the same continuum that we, as person-signs, inhabit.  
 We have a choice between these two competing attitudes, and we have to make a 
decision. Will it be continuity, or will it be play? We seem, at this juncture, to stand where 
William James once stood: 
 …on a mountain pass in the midst of whirling snow and blinding mist through   
 which we get glimpses now and then of paths which may be deceptive. If we stand still  
 we shall be frozen to death. If we take the wrong road we shall be dashed to pieces. We  
 do not certainly know whether there is any right one. What must we do? ' Be strong and  
 of a good courage.' Act for the best, hope for the best, and take what comes. . . . If death  
 ends all, we cannot meet death better. (James, “The Will to Believe” 92) 
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Which is more likely to dash us to pieces? Would we meet death better in the abyss of 
deconstruction, or by asymptotically approximating the end of inquiry? 
 While Peirce can provide no guarantee that we will reach the end of inquiry, it is not 
good enough reason to abandon the entire project of signtific investigation outright—it is not 
reason enough to say that, in place of continuity, there is only play. Rather, the very potential 
that we could reach such an end through the application of the right method is enough to 
maintain, what Colapietro calls, the cheerful hope “of discovering unsuspected regularities 
[Thirdness] and rational consensus” (Colapietro “The Ground of Semiosis” 137). Indeed, it is 
Peirce himself who claims that one “fights the battle of life better under the stimulus of hope” 
(CP 1.406 qtd. in Colapietro “Ground” 137). As Colapietro suggests, if we endorse Derridean 
play our cheerful hope that there is continuity will evaporate:  
 We plummet into a sense of the endtime, a point in time when the end of philosophy  
 (Wittgenstein) or of metaphysics (Derrida) or even of “humanity” itself (Foucault) is  
 announced—sometimes with shrill exuberance, sometimes with muted sadness, but  
 always with absolute certainty. (Colapietro “Ground” 137)  
The certainty with which Derrida marks the closure of the metaphysics of presence is what stifles 
the hope that there could be continuity in the long run. By confining himself to play, he loses 
sight of the tendency and continuity of the process of semiosis. While Derrida champions Peirce 
to show the indefinite referral from sign to sign, he fails to recognize that, for Peirce, that 
indefinite referral is only potentially indefinite.  
 Derrida may not care that he did not get Peirce right. I do not care that Derrida did not get 
Peirce right. The prospect of getting Peirce right seems too great for any one individual anyway.  
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However, were Peirce still alive today, he likely would have thought that Derrida’s playful 
attitude toward philosophy is exactly the kind of attitude which infringes on the progress of 
signtific investigation. It is just the sort of attitude that leads one into a post-truth age—an 
“endtime” (Colapietro 137) where reality no longer holds sway over what might constitute the 
truth. Indeed, in this hellfire that seems everywhere to surround us—the failing climate, the 
fragile economy, the fact the Nazis are crawling out of the gutters in America—we might do best 
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